

## The Effect of Good Corporate Governance on Tax Avoidance: Empirical Study on Trade, Service and Investment Company Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange Period of 2014 – 2020

Mar'atul 'Ainsh Sholikhah,  
Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang

Fajar Nurdin,  
Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang

Alamat Korespondensi: maratulainish@gmail.com, nurdin.fajar@uin-malang.ac.id

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### ABSTRAK

*This research objectives to find out the effect of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committees on tax avoidance of service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020. This study is a quantitative type using multiple linear regression analysis as a hypothesis test. This study used secondary data from the financial statements of service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020. There are 28 samples of service companies listed on the IDX with a research period of 2014-2020 which were selected using the purposive sampling method used in this research. The results showed that the independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and the audit committee had a significant positive effect on tax avoidance with a coefficient of determination of 34.1%. Thus, it can be said that independent commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committees have an important role in tax planning, namely tax avoidance.*

### ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini untuk mengetahui pengaruh dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial dan komite audit terhadap tax avoidance dari perusahaan jasa yang terdaftar di BEI tahun 2014–2020. Penelitian ini berjenis kuantitatif dengan menggunakan menggunakan analisis regresi linear berganda sebagai uji hipotesis. Penelitian ini menggunakan data sekunder dari laporan keuangan perusahaan jasa yang terdaftar di BEI periode 2014 - 2020. Terdapat 28 sampel perusahaan jasa yang terdaftar di BEI dengan periode penelitian tahun 2014 – 2020 yang dipilih menggunakan metode purposive sampling yang digunakan di dalam penelitian ini. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial dan komite audit berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap tax avoidance dengan nilai koefisien determinasi sebesar 34,1%. Sehingga dapat dikatakan dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial dan komite audit memiliki peran penting di dalam melakukan perencanaan pajak yaitu tax avoidance.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background

Tax is one of the important things for the government, because it is the largest source of income for the state. The company will try as little as possible to pay taxes because it is a burden for the company. Companies in minimizing the tax burden, they do tax planning. One of the efforts in tax planning is to do tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is quite unique, because on the one hand the company is allowed to do tax avoidance, but on the other hand it can reduce state revenue.

Tax avoidance is an activity to reduce the tax burden by making tax savings legally in accordance with tax provisions. Tax planning that violates tax provisions is a tax evasion activity. In order not to conflict with the law, the average company prefers to do tax avoidance rather than tax evasion. To carry out tax planning so as not to fall into ambiguity, the tax authorities have created a boundary between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Decision making and policies in tax avoidance are certainly carried out by company leaders. The size of the company's risk depends on the executive character of the company, whether the leader has a risk taker character or tends to be risk averse (Saputra et al., 2015).

An example of a case in Indonesia is the case of tax avoidance on property in Semarang. a developer sells a luxury house for 7.1 billion, but in the notary deed there is a difference of IDR 6.1 billion because what is written in the notary deed is only IDR 940 million. there is a potential value added tax of IDR 610 million and other shortfalls in the final income tax of IDR 300 million, so the total tax shortfall is 900 million. The state can suffer losses of up to tens of billions of rupiah if the developer sells hundreds of luxury housing units. (pajak.go.id).

The State of Tax Justice 2020 reports that the case of tax avoidance in Indonesia ranks fourth in Asia. total losses due to tax evasion by corporate taxpayers reached IDR 67.6 trillion. In 2020 there was a decrease in tax revenue by 19.7% from the target set at IDR 1,198.8 trillion. This happens because many corporate taxpayers are experiencing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and they are taking advantage of tax incentives.

The existence of tax avoidance has a significant impact on the state. The state's income from taxes is reduced. Tax revenues until the end of October 2021 reached IDR 953.6 trillion, which means that it has reached 77.56 percent of the 2021 APBN target. Meanwhile, the realization of 2021 tax revenues grew by 15.3 percent. This was revealed by Sri Mulyani as Minister of Finance at the 2021 State Budget Press Conference.

The purpose of corporate governance is to realize good corporate governance, one of which is in the realm of taxation. In 1998, the phenomenon of corporate governance became known when Indonesia was experiencing a prolonged crisis. The weak implementation of corporate governance in Indonesia has made the recovery process for Indonesia from the

crisis quite long, so that the government and investors have begun to pay special attention to corporate governance practices (Kusmayadi et al., 2015). The corporate governance mechanism includes independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committee (Ginting, 2016).

To improve management supervision and the performance of the board of directors, an independent board of commissioners is needed (Sari, 2014). Institutional ownership affects the amount of pressure received by the management to do tax avoidance, so as to maximize company profits (Zahirah, 2017). In the relevant research, it is stated that the proportion of managerial ownership owned is much smaller than institutional ownership. Thus, in determining company policy, the managerial side does not have the right.

In previous research, there are indicators that influence tax avoidance involving institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the percentage of independent commissioners, and audit committees. Based on the four indicators, they still have different results in each research. The board of commissioners is tasked with supervising the company's management and ensuring the implementation of the company's strategy and is the core of corporate governance. Ownership of shares by other institutions is called institutional ownership. The high level of supervision of management performance is effected by the existence of institutional ownership. Meanwhile, the ownership of share ownership by the management is referred to as managerial ownership. In this case, the management has the right to participate in making company decisions.

Institutional ownership will be able to influence, discipline, and monitor managers, and can impact tax avoidance practices (Zahirah, 2017). Meanwhile, the number of shares of managerial ownership does not affect the practice of tax avoidance. Putri & Lawita (2019) argues that the higher the level of managerial ownership and institutional ownership, the less likely the practice of tax avoidance is. Because the level of supervision is also getting tighter as well as the high share ownership by managers, it will make managers to consider the continuity of their company. T. B. Santoso & Muid (2014) stated that the lack of an independent board of commissioners' role in controlling and overseeing the actions of the tax avoidance executive, thus making the independent board of commissioners not affect the practice. The management works more effectively in managing the company because of demands from independent commissioners who come from outside the company, therefore it does not affect tax avoidance (Saputra et al., 2015). The results of research conducted by Nugraheni & Pratomo, (2018) stated that the audit committee has a significant influence on tax avoidance. To create good operational performance which includes corporate governance and preparation of financial reports, the audit committee has a supervisory role.

Due to the lack of research on tax avoidance that uses service companies as objects to be studied and at

the same time as a differentiator from previous research, service companies are used in this research object. Service companies are an industry that dominates the pace of business growth in Indonesia and is a highly knowledge-based industry. Tax avoidance is calculated using the cash tax rate (CASH ETR) formula, which is the tax burden divided by the profit before tax (Multi & Limarjani, 2020).

## **2. THEORY FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES**

### **2.1 Good Corporate Governance**

Cadbury committee in Kusmayadi et al., (2015) corporate governance is a set of rules relating to the company's external and internal stakeholders and shareholders by having their own rights and obligations, namely a system of directing and supervising the company. Good corporate governance is a provision regarding the relationship between shareholders, management, creditors, directors, employees, and other internal and external stakeholders as well as to improve the integrity of the company. The existence of corporate governance in the company as one of the taxpayers which describes the relationship between actors within the company greatly determines the direction of the company's performance. Because corporate governance depends on the tax planning system (Winata, 2014). A company is supervised and directed by a corporate governance system to support the company operational activities (Putri & Lawita 2019)

According to the OECD in Kusmayadi et al., (2015) there are five basic principles of corporate governance. First, fairness, namely fair and equal treatment when exercising interest rights in accordance with contracts and applicable laws and regulations. The second is transparency, namely the openness of the decision-making process and openness to the disclosure of data and related information about the company. The third is accountability, namely clarity of functions, structures, systems and responsibilities of corporate bodies for effective company management. The fourth responsibility is to comply with the principles of a healthy company and applicable laws in running the company. Fifth, independence is a prerequisite for carrying out professional management with no conflict of interest with relevant laws and regulations and no influence or pressure from management.

The Indonesian Corporate Governance Forum (FCGI), stated that corporate governance functions as a regulator and controller of the company against internal or external parties (Salsabila et al., 2021) Good corporate governance position in the economic system is as a pillar of trust in the company (Fahrhani, 2016).

There are 4 principles of Good Corporate Governance:

1. Vision

2. Participation
3. Equality
4. Professional

### **2.2 Independent Board of Commissioners**

According to financial services authority regulation number 57/POJK.04/2017 concerning the implementation of governance of securities companies that carry out business activities as securities underwriters and securities brokers, independent commissioners are members of the board of commissioners who are not affiliated with securities companies, there is no authority to control the company securities, come from outside the securities company and are eligible to become members of independent commissioners. The number of independent commissioners is at least 30% of the members of the board of commissioners or if the board of commissioners is more than two people. The role of the independent board of commissioners is to supervise the activities of its management so as not to violate the regulations (Sarrra, 2017).

An independent commissioner is a member who does not have a share ownership relationship, finances or has the authority to control the company. The existence of this independent commissioner is able to oversee the activities of the company's management because it is able to encourage management to disclose information about the company to shareholders. This is in accordance with one of the principles of corporate governance that is transparency. An independent board of commissioners is proposed by shareholders who are not controlling shareholders and must understand the rules and laws of the capital market (Winata, 2014). Fraud in tax reporting can be minimized if the proportion of the board of commissioners is high (Lolana & Dwimulyani, 2019). The opportunistic nature of management is a way to increase profits by reducing costs, one of which is taxes, because so far profit has been an indicator of the success of a manager. (Sari, 2014)

### **2.3 Institutional Ownership**

Institutional ownership is an institution that is very interested in the investments made, including stock investments. In managing company investments, institutions usually hand over responsibility to certain departments. Potential control activities by management are too high due to monitoring by professional institutions (Cahyono et al., 2016). Basically, institutional ownership seeks to maximize profits in order to obtain a fairly high dividend or convert it back into equity. This is related to tax avoidance (Ashari et al., 2020).

Institutional ownership is the amount of share ownership by other institutions, one of which is the government. The existence of institutional ownership is able to increase supervision from external parties of the company so as to minimize deviant behavior by the company. The level of institutional ownership can

encourage management to avoid taxes that can maximize company profits. The existence of institutional ownership will make management try to make decisions that will maximize the welfare of shareholders (Annisa & Kurniasih, 2012). To prevent abuse of power in tax evasion, need a system of checks and balances (Wijayani, 2018). Institutional ownership can be used as a deduction from taxable income due to the burden of dividends (Moeljono, 2020). In managing the company, the institution ownership to be passive because it only limits the decisions of the company management (Hermiyetti & Katlanis, 2016)

#### **2.4 Managerial ownership**

Managerial ownership is the proportion of the number of shares owned by the management. Management is directly responsible for the company's operations, including determining the accounting policies used by the company (Ashari et al., 2020). The role of management in generating company profits is also getting higher, the more shares owned by company management, the greater the influence of company management on tax avoidance practices.

Managerial ownership is share ownership by the company's management. Therefore, the management will be careful in making company policies so as not to have a bad impact on their shares. Because the size of managerial ownership will also increase tax avoidance practices that can be profitable for the company. A great responsibility a manager must be able to optimize profits for the company as well as great rewards for the manager himself (Prasetyo & Pramuka, 2018). Conflicts between managers of other parties in the company can be reduced if there is managerial ownership in it (Rejeki et al 2019).

#### **2.5 Audit Committee**

The Audit Committee Association states that the audit committee is a committee that works professionally that supervises financial statements, audits and corporate governance. High quality corporate governance within the company, is influenced by the high number of audit committees (Triyanti et al., 2020). The audit committee is a member that has the authority to oversee external audits of financial statements and corporate governance. In preparing the company's financial statements, the audit committee is tasked with supervising as a form of protection for shareholders.

The implementation of corporate governance in a company must have an audit committee as one of the organizations that has an important role (Saputra et al., 2015). The Indonesian Stock Exchange states that every company is required to have an audit committee chaired by an independent commissioner (Cahyono et al., 2016) . The high quality in providing financial statement information is influenced by the existence of an audit committee within the company (Fahriani, 2016). Along with the board of commissioners, the audit committee helps improve corporate governance by

increasing oversight of management (Nugraheni & Pratomo 2018). The company's internal control, accounting and financial policies are resolved by the audit committees (Sarra, 2017)

#### **2.6 Tax Avoidance**

Tax avoidance is defined as a transaction model that aims to minimize the tax burden by exploiting the weaknesses of the tax laws in a country (Sari, 2014). The government in collecting taxes from the public will create a tax ratio that can be used to see the phenomenon of tax avoidance in Indonesia. Good tax collection performance can be seen from the high tax ratio (Moeljono, 2020). Tax avoidance is an effort to avoid tax that does not violate the provisions of the law. Tax avoidance like this is beneficial for the company because it can increase company profits because the tax burden is reduced. Therefore, the company will make every effort to pay less tax by avoiding this tax.

Tax avoidance is a decision making to determine when, how, and with which party a transaction occurs that allows to achieve business objectives and minimize tax burden. (dina marfiroh). Changing location, refraining and avoiding tax according to the law are the usual ways to do tax avoidance (Putri & Lawita, 2019). According to Monterson in Sari (2014), tax avoidance is an activity to minimize the tax burden while considering the consequences. Tax avoidance in companies causes company profits to increase compared to those who do not do tax avoidance (Lolana & Dwimulyani, 2019).

There are 3 characters of tax avoidance:

- 1.The existence of artificial elements where it seems as if there are various settings in it
- 2.Exploiting loopholes in the law
- 3.Taxpayers are shown how to avoid taxes by consultants on condition that they maintain confidentiality (Zahirah, 2017)

#### **2.7 Hypotheses**

##### **Effect of the Independent Board of Commissioners on Tax Avoidance**

According to Rohyana & Maryana (2021) in their research the board of commissioners has a positive effect on tax avoidance, due to the higher the proportion of the number of the board of commissioners, the better the implementation performance management oversight within the company. This research is in line with research by Sunarsih & Handayani (2016) which states that the board of commissioners have an influence on tax avoidance.

H<sub>1</sub> : Independent board of commissioners (X<sub>1</sub>) has a partial effect on tax avoidance

##### **Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance**

Wijayanti (2016) states that institutional ownership has a significant effect on tax avoidance, because the number of share ownership is above 5%. Institutional ownership plays a role in carrying out

managerial supervision, because the greater the level of managerial supervision, the higher the level of institutional share ownership. This result is also similar to Krishna's research (2019) which states that institutional ownership has a significant effect on tax avoidance.

H<sub>2</sub> : Institutional ownership has a partial effect on tax avoidance.

#### Effect of Managerial Ownership on Tax Avoidance

Ashari et al. (2020) stated that managerial ownership has a significant effect on tax avoidance. This is because the management has a role in the company's operations and in determining the company's accounting policies. The higher the managerial ownership, the higher the company management will do tax avoidance. Management as a shareholder of the company will be careful in making tax avoidance decisions so that it does not have a negative impact on its shares (Sunarsih & Handayani, 2016).


H<sub>3</sub> : Managerial ownership has partial effect on tax avoidance.

#### Effect of the Audit Committee on Tax Avoidance

Nugraheni & Pratomo (2018) state that the audit committee has a partial effect on tax avoidance. Corporate tax avoidance is influenced by the size of the audit committee.

H<sub>4</sub> : The Audit Commission has a partial effect on tax avoidance

#### Conceptual Framework



#### Effect of Independent Board of Commissioners, Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership and Audit Committee on Tax Avoidance

Rohyana & Maryana (2021) in their research states that there is a significant influence between

corporate governance on tax avoidance. The implementation of good corporate governance will also have a good impact on the company's operational activities. So that corporate governance simultaneously affects tax avoidance (Dewi, 2019).

H<sub>5</sub> : Independent commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership and audit commissions have a simultaneous effect on tax avoidance.

#### The proposed hypothesis is based on the conceptual framework, as follows:

H<sub>1</sub> : The independent board of commissioners has partial effect on tax avoidance

H<sub>2</sub> : Institutional ownership has a partial effect on tax avoidance.

H<sub>3</sub> : Managerial ownership has a partial effect on tax avoidance.

H<sub>4</sub> : Audit committee have a partial effect on tax avoidance.

H<sub>5</sub> : Independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committee have a simultaneous effect on tax avoidance.

### 3. RESEARCH METHODS

This research is quantitative research using secondary data in the form of financial statements of service companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2016-2020 period. This research uses multiple linear regression analysis as a hypothesis testing tool. The population of this study is all service companies listed on the IDX in 2016-2020. Determination of the sample randomly through target random sampling from a population of 206 companies with the following criteria: a) Service companies listed on the IDX for the 2016-2020 period, b) The company publishes its financial statements in rupiah currency, c) Service companies that issue financial statements in rupiah and expire on December 31, d) Service companies have data suitable for this research.

### 4. RESULTS

The study objectives to know the effect of independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committees on tax avoidance. The population of this research uses service companies listed on the IDX with a total of 206 companies. The sampling technique in this study used purposive sampling, with a total number of samples obtained by 28 service companies for the 2016-2020 period.

**Table 2**  
**List of Research Sample Companies for the 2016-2020 Period**

Company name	Code	Company name	Code
Bayu Buana Tbk.	BAYU	Ramayana Lestari Sentosa Tbk.	RALS
MNC Investama Tbk.	BHIT	Midi Utama Indonesia Tbk.	MIDI
Global Mediacom Tbk.	BMTR	Erajaya Swasembada Tbk.	ERAA
Bakrie & Brothers Tbk.	BNBR	Catur Sentosa Adiprana Tbk.	CSAP
Saraswati Griya Lestari Tbk.	HOTL	AKR Corporindo Tbk.	AKRA
Mitra Keluarga Karyasehat Tbk.	MIKA	Arita Prima Indonesia Tbk.	APII
Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk.	SRTG	Colorpak Indonesia Tbk.	CLPI
Island Concepts Indonesia Tbk.	ICON	Inter Delta Tbk.	INTD
MNC Land Tbk.	KPIG	Jaya Konstruksi Manggala Pratama Tbk.	JKON
Panorama Sentrawisata Tbk.	PANR	Lautan Luas Tbk.	LTLS
Metrodada Electronics Tbk.	MTDL	Mitra Pinasthika Mustika Tbk.	MPMX
Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk.	JTPE	Multi Indocitra Tbk.	MICE
Intermedia Capital Tbk.	MDIA	Tigaraksa Satria Tbk.	TGKA
Supra Boga Lestari Tbk.	RANC	United Tractors Tbk.	UNTR

Source: www.idnfinancials.com (data processed by researchers, 2022)

### Normality test

The normality test was used to know whether the data used in this research were normally distributed or not. Testing the normality of the data in this research used the One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov technique. The assumption in this research is that the data is normally distributed if the significance value is more than 0.05.

**Table 3**  
**Normality Test Results**  
**One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test**

		Unstandardized Residual	
N		196	
Normal Parameters <sup>a,b</sup>	Mean	,0000000	
	Std. Deviation	,23232216	
	Most Extreme Differences		
		Absolute	,062
		Positive	,062
		Negative	-,043
Test Statistic		,062	
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)		,200 <sup>c,d</sup>	

a. Test distribution is Normal.

b. Calculated from data.

c. Lilliefors Significance Correction.

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

According to the findings of the normality test using the One Sample Kolmogorov Smirnov Test, the Asymp Sig. result was 0.200. Thus, the value is greater than 0.05 which means it has met the requirements in the normality test and the data in this research are normally distributed.

### Multicollinearity Test

The multicollinearity test was used to find out whether there was a correlation between the independent variables in this research. The multicollinearity test in this research used VIF and tolerance values. The assumption in this research is that the data does not occur multicollinearity if the VIF value is <10 and the tolerance value is >0.10.

**Table 4**  
**Multicollinearity Test Results**

Model	Coefficients <sup>a</sup>		
	B	Toleranc e	VIF
1 (Constant)	,294		
Dewan_Komisaris_Indepen den	,090	,974	1,02 7
Kepemilikan_Institusional	,148	,706	1,41 6
Kepemilikan_Manajerial	-,064	,719	1,39 1
Komite_Audit	,240	,935	1,06 9

**a. Dependent Variable: Tax\_Avoidance**

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

According to the findings of the multicollinearity test, the VIF value for each variable is less than 10 and the tolerance value for each variable is greater than 0.10. Thus, this value has met the requirements in the multicollinearity test and the data in this research did not have multicollinearity.

**Autocorrelation Test**

The autocorrelation test is used to find out whether there is a correlation between sample data sorted by time or to detect a confounding error in period t with a confounding error in period t-1 in this research. The autocorrelation test in this research used the Durbin Watson value. The assumption in this research is that the data does not autocorrelated if the value of  $dU < d < 4-dU$ .

**Table 5**  
**Autocorrelation Test Results**

Model Summary <sup>b</sup>		
Model	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,27969	1,953

a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee, Independent Board of Commissioners, **Coefficientsa**

Institutional Ownership, Management Ownership

b. Dependent Variable: Tax Avoidance


Source: processed by researchers, 2022

Based on the results of the autocorrelation test, the Durbin Watson value is 1.953. The basis for decision making in this test is if  $dU < d < 4-dU$ , which means that there is no autocorrelation. Meanwhile, the dU value when viewed from the Durbin Watson table is 1.7247 and dL 1.8079. Then, the result is  $1.8079 < 1.953 < 2.1921(4-1.8079)$ . So, there is no autocorrelation in the data in this research.

**Heteroscedasticity Test**

Heteroscedasticity test is used to find out whether in the regression model there is an inequality of variance from the residuals of one observation to another. Heteroscedasticity testing in this research uses a Scatter Plot graph between the predicted value of the dependent variable, namely ZPRED and the residual SRESID. The assumption in this research is that there is no heteroscedasticity if the points do not form a pattern and spread above and below zero.

**Figure 1**  
**Heteroscedasticity Test Results**



Source: processed by researchers, 2022

According to the findings of the heteroscedasticity test, it shows a scatterplot graph. The basis for decision making in this research, if the points above are evenly distributed above and below the number 0 and do not form a certain pattern. The graph above shows that the number of points is evenly distributed above and below the number 0 and the distribution pattern is random, so it does not form a certain pattern. Based on these results, it can be concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity in the data in this research.

**Multiple Linear Regression Test**

**Table 6**  
**Multiple Linear Regression Test Results**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients
	B	Std. Error	Beta
1 (Constant)	,779	,085	



Independent Board of Commissioners	,139	,019	,337
Institutional Ownership	,053	,022	,112
Management Ownership	,088	,035	,116
Audit Committee	-,225	,017	-,629

a. Dependent Variable: Tax\_Avoidance

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

Based on the results of multiple linear regression, the equations obtained from this research are as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + e$$

$$Y = 0,779 + + 0,139X_1 + 0,053X_2 + 0,088X_3 + (-0,024X_4) + e$$

Description:

- Y = Tax Avoidance (Cash ETR)
- X<sub>1</sub> = Independent Board of Commissioners
- X<sub>2</sub> = Institutional Ownership
- X<sub>3</sub> = Managerial ownership
- X<sub>4</sub> = Audit Committee
- E = Error of Estimation

Obtained a constant value of 0.779. This means that if the value of the independent variable in this research is equal to zero, then the value of the dependent variable in this research is 0.779. The regression coefficient value of b<sub>1</sub> is 0.139. This means that for every increase of one independent commissioner variable, the tax avoidance variable increases by 0.139 assuming other independent variables remain. The regression coefficient value of b<sub>2</sub> is 0.053. This means that for every increase in one variable of institutional ownership, the tax avoidance variable increases by 0.053 with the assumption that the other independent variables remain. The regression coefficient value of b<sub>3</sub> is 0.088. This means that for every increase in the managerial ownership variable, the tax avoidance variable increases by 0.088 assuming the other independent variables remain. The regression coefficient value of b<sub>4</sub> is -0.225. This means that for every increase in the audit committee variable, the tax avoidance variable tax avoidance variable decreased by -0.225 assuming the other independent variables remain.

#### Coefficient of Determination Test

Table 7

#### Coefficient of Determination Test Results

The coefficient of determination is used to measure the ability of the independent variable to reveal the dependent variable. This research uses the

adjusted R square value as a regression tool. If there is an addition of one independent variable, then the adjusted R square value can increase or decrease.

Model Summary			
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
1	,584 <sup>a</sup>	,341	,203
a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee, Independent Board of Commissioners, Institutional Ownership, Management Ownership			

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

Based on the results of the coefficient of determination, the adjusted R square value is 0.341 or 34.1%. Thus, tax avoidance can be described by 34.1% by the independent variable in this research. Meanwhile, the remaining 65.9% can be explained by other variables that were not included in this research.

#### Partial Test (t)

Partial test is used to know the effect of individual independent variables on the dependent variable. The t-test measurement uses a comparison between t-table and t-count which shows a probability number with a significance level of 0.05. The assumption in this research is that it has an effect if Sig < 0.05 or t-count > t-table.

#### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
1 (Constant)	,779	,085		9,125	,000
Independent Board of Commissioners	,139	,019	,337	7,204	,000
Institutional Ownership	,053	,022	,112	2,402	,017
Managerial Ownership	,088	,035	,116	2,504	,013
Audit Committee	-,225	,017	-,629	-13,610	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Tax Avoidance

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

Based on the results of the partial test, the significance value for the independent board of commissioners' variable is 0.000 and the t-count value is 7,204 > t-table 1,97240. The significance value for the institutional ownership variable is 0.017 and the t-count



value is  $2.402 > t\text{-table } 1,97240$ . The significance value for managerial ownership variable is  $0.013$  and the t-count value is  $2.504 > t\text{-table } 1,97240$ . the significance value for the audit committee variable is  $0.000$  and the t-count value is  $-13,610 > t\text{-table } 1,97240$ . Thus, it can be summed up that the independent variables have a significant positive effect on tax avoidance, except for the audit committee variable have a significant negative effect on tax avoidance.

#### Simultaneous Test (f)

Simultaneous test was used to measure the effect of independent variables consisting of independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit committee on the dependent variable, namely tax avoidance simultaneously. The f-test measurement uses a comparison between the F-table and the F-count which shows a probability number with a significance level of  $0.05$ . The assumption in this study is that it has an effect if  $\text{Sig} < 0.05$  or  $\text{F-count} > \text{F-table}$ .

**Table 8**  
**Simultaneous Test Results**

ANOVA <sup>a</sup>					
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	,114	4	,029	8,654	,025 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	5,890	135	,044		
Total	6,005	139			

- a. Dependent Variable: Tax Avoidance  
b. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee, Independent Board of Commissioners, Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership

Source: processed by researchers, 2022

ANOVA <sup>a</sup>					
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	5,122	4	1,280	71,758	,000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	3,390	190	,018		
Total	8,512	194			

- a. Dependent Variable: Tax Avoidance  
b. Predictors: (Constant), , Audit Committee, Independent Board of Commissioners, Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership

Based on the results of the simultaneous test, a significance value of  $0.000$  was obtained, which means this value is smaller than  $0.05$ . Thus, it can be concluded that the independent variables have a significant effect on the dependent variable. This conclusion is also

supported by the results of F-count and F-table, namely the F-count value of  $71,758 > \text{F-table } 2.42$ .

Based on the F-test output, it can be summed up that  $H_5$  is accepted. The independent board of commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and the audit committee simultaneously have an effect on tax avoidance.

#### Effect of the Independent Board of Commissioners on Tax Avoidance

Testing the first hypothesis to formulate an independent board of commissioners has a significant effect on tax avoidance. From the results of the partial test (t) obtained a significance value of  $0.000 < 0.05$  and the t-count value  $7,204 > t\text{ table } 1.97240$ . Thus, it can be concluded that the independent board of commissioners (X1) has an effect on tax avoidance (Y), and when viewed from the t-count value which is positive, it indicates that the independent board of commissioners has a positive effect on tax avoidance. If the percentage of the independent board of commissioners is high, the higher the level of company supervision in carrying out tax avoidance. Therefore, the first hypothesis is accepted, which states that there is an effect of independent commissioners on tax avoidance in service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020.

The independent board of commissioners is a member of the commission board who comes from outside the company and is not affiliated with a securities company. The higher the percentage on the independent board of commissioners in a company, the higher the level of supervision on the performance of the company's directors, thereby reducing tax avoidance.

#### Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance

Testing the second hypothesis to formulate institutional ownership has a significant effect on tax avoidance. From the results of the partial test (t) obtained a significance value of  $0.017 < 0.05$  and a t-count value of  $2.402 > t\text{ table } 1.97240$ . Thus, it can be summed up that institutional ownership (X2) has an effect on tax avoidance (Y), and when viewed from the positive t-count value, it indicates that institutional ownership has a positive effect on tax avoidance. If the number of institutional ownership increases, the higher the company's tax avoidance will be. Therefore, the second hypothesis is accepted, which states that there is an effect of institutional ownership on tax avoidance in service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020.

Institutional ownership is share ownership by other institutions that have a role in monitoring the company's management. Institutional parties have a responsibility to the public to help supervise the company's management not to carry out activities that can harm the company in the long term in tax avoidance.

#### Effect of Managerial Ownership on Tax Avoidance

Testing the third hypothesis to formulate managerial ownership has a significant effect on tax avoidance. From the results of the partial test (t) obtained a significance value of 0,013 <0.05 and the value of t count 2.504 > t table 1.97240. Thus, it can be summed up that managerial ownership (X3) has an effect on tax avoidance (Y), and when viewed from the positive t-count value, it indicates that managerial ownership has a positive effect on tax avoidance. If the number of managerial ownership increases, the higher the company's tax avoidance will be. Therefore, the third hypothesis is accepted, which states that there is an effect of managerial ownership on tax avoidance in service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020.

Managerial ownership is share ownership by the company's management. The existence of share ownership by managerial parties will push the management to be more thorough in making company decisions. Therefore, they will also feel the impact directly from the decisions they make regarding tax avoidance.

#### **Effect of the Audit Committee on Tax Avoidance**

Testing the fourth hypothesis to formulate the audit committee has a significant effect on tax avoidance. From the results of the partial test (t) obtained a significance value of 0.000 <0.05 and a t-count value of -13,610 > t-table 1,97240. Thus, it can be summed up that the audit committee (X4) has negative effect on tax avoidance (Y). Also, if viewed from the negative t value, it indicates that audit committee has a negative effect on tax avoidance. If the number of audit committees increases, the company's tax avoidance will be lower.. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is accepted, which states that there is an effect of the audit committee on tax avoidance in service companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2020.

The audit committee is the committee that is responsible for overseeing the process of preparing financial reports and conducting audits within the company. The audit committee plays a role in setting tax burden policies related to tax avoidance activities.

## **5. Conclusion**

Independent commissioners have an influence on tax avoidance. This is because the higher the percentage of independent commissioners, the higher the supervision of management performance in tax avoidance. Institutional ownership has an influence on tax avoidance. This is due to the existence of share ownership by external institutions, encouraging them to supervise management to ensure their sustainable investment, and to achieve maximum profit, institutional parties will encourage management to minimize the tax burden through tax planning. Managerial ownership has an influence on tax avoidance. Ownership of shares by the management will make the management of the company will also feel the direct impact of the decisions they make. Thus, they

must be careful in optimizing the company's profits so as not to cause losses. The audit committee has a negative influence on tax avoidance. This is because the audit committee is a committee that supervises financial performance policies and plays a role in determining corporate tax burden policies that have a relationship with tax avoidance activities.

## **6. Implications And Limitations**

This study uses the good corporate governance variable as an independent variable so that it is expected to use different variables and different research objects, so as to obtain satisfactory results and can be used as a comparison between previous studies.

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