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INTERPRETATION OF JIHAD DOCTRINE: RADICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Interpretation of a religious doctrine is very important and can affect one's behavior, in addition to the context of external situations and conditions. The interpretation of *jihad* as one of the Islamic doctrines is also interesting to explore, especially the understanding of the radical Islam in Indonesia. This study aims to understand their interpretation of *jihad* doctrine perspective the radical Islam in Indonesia. The research method in collecting data uses observation, interviews and documentation. The data analysis uses descriptive qualitative techniques that focus on the interpretation of *jihad* doctrine. The findings of this research reveal that interpretation the doctrine of *jihad* perspective of the radical Islam in Indonesia is a reductive interpretation. They emphasis only hold on to parts of the Qur'an but ignore other verses of the Qur'an and took only one meaning from the various interpretations of *jihad*. When they interpreted *Jihad* only as war, the substantive meaning of *jihad* became vague. With regard, the term of *jihad* became negative connotation that identic with terror. Moreover, the interpretation is very radical that oppose the majority of moderate Muslim scholar. They hold that *jihad* has very broad and profound understanding. The historical context and the principle of religion such as love, mercy, harmony, peace and tolerant of others should be taken into consideration.

Keywords:

Interpretation, doctrine, *jihad*, radical, Islam

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, *jihad* as a concept is often debated in the mass media and academic literature, both in the East and in the West.¹ And the term *jihad* has also given rise to *pejorative* perception. This arises because the term is used in connection with various incidents of social unrest since the 1970s in Indonesia called "Command Jih ā d". It is not known exactly whether the name was used by the group concerned or only naming from outside which is part of military-political engineering. If the first thing is true then that use means to reduce, even degrade the notion of *jihad*. Whereas the second thing has caused widespread public fear to use the term (Rahardjo, 1990).²

The problem will be different, if the understanding of *jihad* is used as part of historical events, such as the history of Indonesia at the beginning of independence around 1945, when Bung Tomo shouted *All ā hu Akbar* through the RRI mouthpiece in Surabaya as a cry "Holy War" against the colonial forces, which not only aroused the enthusiasm among groups *Hizb All ā h* and *Barisan Sabil Allāh* in boarding schools, but Also move the entire Indonesian nation to defend freedom as a sacred right of nations to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism. That is roughly the meaning of *jihad* for the Shiite people of Iran, when they oppose the power of the tyrant Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Likewise, it is this spirit that gives power to the Iranian people when facing Iraqi aggression (Rais, 1987).³

A very sensitive issue today is when the call to *jihad* is linked to acts of terrorism (Chomsky, 2001),⁴ self-sacrifice (suicide bombing), and violence in the name of religion. However, the notion of *jihad* in the Islamic tradition cannot be reduced to such acts, and many Muslims condemn them based on Islamic traditions, because they have nothing to do with the wider requirements of *jihad*, struggle in the way of God (Johnson, 2002). [5]

Jihad is often cited as the cause of violence in Islamic societies (Khadhuri,

2002).⁶ This kind of understanding still needs to be re-examined. However, it must not be forgotten that social realities that develop outside can also trigger fundamental social implications.

According to Muhammad Amin Abdullah that normatively, none of the religious teachings that encourage and encourage followers to commit acts of *violence* against followers of other religions (*others*) outside the group. However, historically-factually, violence was found that was carried out by some members of the community under the pretext of religion (Abdullah, 2002).⁷

Several events in the country, since from Situbondo, Pekalongan, Tasikmalaya, Aceh, Maluku, East Timor, Mataram, also abroad such as in Pakistan, India, Ireland, which made religion as a powerful enough tool to ignite the emotions and anger of the masses in achieving goals in reality outside of religion itself. It should be acknowledged that it is difficult indeed to draw clear cut demarcation line between the area of religion and non-religious regions (social, economic, political, cultural). Both of them at one time felt mixed up, intertwined and woven together in such a way (UGM Research and Development Center, 1997).⁸ According to the Islamic concept, religion covers all aspects of life. Meanwhile, the Western concept, religion is limited to deal with matters that are only rituals (Suprayogo, 2003).⁹

Although religion has values and morals that can be used as a way of life for human society, on the other hand religion can also sometimes be a trigger for conflict which in turn can cause violence or widespread disputes (Santoso, 2002).¹⁰

This study is based on a large case accompanying the emergence of the term *jihad* in the surface, namely the bombing in the entertainment center of Legian, Kuta, Bali. The next day, an English-language magazine *Lattitude* released by Degung Santikarma lowered coverage of the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Al-Mukmin boarding school

Ngruki titled *School of Jihad* (Jawa Pos, 2002). 11 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the *Amir* of the *Mujāhidīn* Council of Indonesia was a religious elite figure who often caused controversy, both in the public and political arenas. In fact, it is not uncommon to be responded irrationally by supporters and opponents. Likewise the figures of Amrozi, Ali Ghufron and Imam Samudra as the Bali Bombers.

The term *jihād* reappears with the Bali bombing incident. This term is always echoed by the three perpetrators, both in prison or prison cells, and before the court. The words that came out of the mouths of the three actors, besides *jihād* also cried Takbir *Allāhu Akbar* with enthusiasm and full of confidence. This is what drives the desire of researchers to understand what exactly is the meaning of *jihād* they understand.

There are a number of things that lay behind the importance of this Bali Bomb phenomenon that needs to be studied (Effendy, 2003).¹² *First*, the Bali Bombing did not occur in a *vacuum*. The international world saw the Bali Bombing as an "inseparable" part of the tragedy of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of 11 September 2001, a year earlier. *Second*, some of the bombers in Bali have links to Islamic educational institutions - *pesantren* - in the past. They are people who have tasted *pesantren* education in their youth. From this developed the perception that they had absorbed the teachings (*doctrine*) of Islam, from certain views that preached radicalism. *Third*, the existence of religious terminology that they use to justify their activities that are against the law and human dignity. In this case, the terms of *Allah Akbar* or *jihād* that they often shout out make people willing to make room for religious elements in actions that are against the law. Maybe some Muslims are of the view that the Bali Bombers were wrong in applying the teachings of Islam, but if they behave that the actions are also based on the "teachings" of Islam as they believe, to fight the "enemies" of Islam, and explain Islam as a friendly, tolerant and Mercy is not an easy matter. Although the tragedy has

been placed (in part) the Muslims as the culprits. Even Islam itself is blamed as a religion that justifies terrorism. The tragedies have also placed the face of intolerance, extremism and terrorism in the Islamic world.

The above background proves that attention to the theme of *jihad* is apparently still quite high and there are still interesting aspects that still need to be studied further. This has encourage researchers to study the doctrine of *jihad* in the perspective of the radical Islam in Indonesia especially the Bali Bombers.

A. Methods/Materials

This research used a qualitative research (Bogdan, 1975; Denzin, 1994; Strauss, 2003).¹³ The type of research used is a *discourse analysis* that focuses on extracting the meaning of *jihad* in the perspective of the Bali Bombers. General characteristics in doing of *Discourse Analysis* are as follows: *First*, studying discourse means learning examples an expression that actually occurs. The objects of analysis are not things that are designed to test the language institutions they have, but rather the actual examples are contained in daily communication, such as: conversations between friends, interactions of classmates, editorials of newspapers. *Second*, attention is focused on language units that go beyond the boundaries of a single sentence with the focus directed at an expanded sequence of expressions, both contained in a conversation and text. *Third*, there is a relationship between language and non-language activities that are relevant to efforts to explore the relationship between language and ideology (Thompson, 2003).¹⁴ This analysis is used in the context of understanding the thoughts of the three Bali Bombers.

The informants who were used as data sources of information included: Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, and Imam Samudra as the Bali Bombers. Also needed to be explored by informants from families, close people of the perpetrators, religious teachers, students at traditional Muslim school (*santri*) alumni of Al-Islam Islamic boarding schoolTenggulun,

formal leaders at both the sub-district and village levels and leaders of the Tenggulun regional religious organization, Solokuro, Lamongan. Similarly, family and people close to Imam Samudra in Banten.

Data collection techniques that researchers use is observation, interview (Silverman, 1997)¹⁵ and documentation. Because it is very relevant to explore the doctrine of *jihad* in perspective naturally Bali bombers October 12, 2002, which is termed *getting in and getting along*. (Loftland, 1994) ¹⁶ So, other than using data obtained from *field research*, also utilizing documentation data in the form of books or *kitab*s, personal notebooks, papers, magazines, bulletins, articles, leaflets, and newspapers that relate to the Bali Bombing.

The observation process that researchers did by doing participant observation in the lives of the people to be observed, namely the Bali Bombers. To increase the accuracy, the researchers did as follow: *First*, the notes that researchers did were outside of their knowledge. *Second*, researchers establish a good relationship (*good rapport*) with them so as not to arouse suspicion. *Third*, researchers try to do intensive participation.

Direct contact with face to face relationship between researchers as information seekers (*interviewers* or *information hunters*) with the Bali Bombers as sources of information (*interviewees*). The technique is used to collect social data, especially to find out the responses, opinions, beliefs, feelings, motivations, and ideas of the Bali Bombers and the search for information on several informants up to the level of saturation (*data saturation*) is found and new results are not obtained and successfully found a constant pattern of information (*Snow Ball Sampling*). (Lin, 1976; Suhartono, 2002).¹⁷ Then the researchers analyzed the *statements* that develop, the *meanings* that are understood, the meaningful *themes*, and the general description of the experiences found from them.

The steps are as follows: *First*, conduct interviews with Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, and Imam Samudra, including to pay attention to their expressions that often arise about *jihad*, religion, the future, idealized society or perceived concern. *Second*, understand the social background of life and activities of the three actors before the Bali Bombing. *Third*, comparing one finding with the next. *Fourth*, arrange categories, identify characteristics and develop hypotheses and theories based on the data obtained. This process does not only operate linearly, but it works repeatedly until a profound understanding is found.

Data analysis is the process of organizing and sorting data into patterns, categories, and basic description units so that themes can be found and work hypotheses can be formulated as suggested by the data. The process of analyzing the researchers' data began by examining all available data from various sources, namely from interviews, observations that have been written in the field notes, personal documents, official documents, pictures, photographs, etc. from the Bali Bombers. According to Hubberman and Miles, there are three stages of analysis: *data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing / verifying* (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).¹⁸ After reading, studying, and analyzing, the next step is to carry out data reduction by making abstractions. Abstraction is an attempt to make a summary of the core, process, and statements that need to be maintained and presented so that it stays in it. The next step is to arrange them into units, then categorize them while making code. Next, the stage of checking the validity of the data. And the final stage, the interpretation of data in processing interim results becomes substantive theory.

B. Results and Discussion

In this section, the researcher will present the results of research on the doctrine of *jihad* in the perspective of the Bali Bombers, which are motivated by the dominant *motives of religion*.

Of the few opinions in placing religion as a factor of justification and the plunger (*motivation*) actions. For some, the involvement of religion in acts of violence perpetrated by perpetrators is seen as an anomalous form of the esoteric message of religion that actually wants peace and safety. From a sociological study, there is a tendency is involved in the practice of religious violence seen as a continuation of the construction process of the religious doctrines that never deserted from various interests, such as the doctrine of *jihad*. The understanding of the *jihad* doctrine is very heterogeneous and varied. There are some people who understand explicitly (*firm*) that is the doctrine of holy war *jihad* and of sacred violence. But there are also some people who understand it softly and moderately. Ofcourse different understanding will lead to different social actions. For those who understand *jihad* as violence and holy war, it is justified to carry out attacks against adherents of other religions or communities, both directly and indirectly with a reason justified by religious doctrine, such as fighting infidels and immoralists. As called by David C. Rapoport, action Bali bombings was considered by some as acts of *terrorism sacred* or holy terror (Rapoports, 2003; Hasheem, 2004).¹⁹

According to Amrozi relating to understanding the doctrine of *jihad*:

Theologically speaking, *jihad* has many meanings. Its scope is very broad, ranging from fighting against lust to take up arms to the battlefield or fight. However, there is a substance that is to understand the value of *jihad* as a call to religious *Haq*. If it is associated with the *fi Sabil of Allāh*, *jihad* means fighting or fighting in the path of Allāh. So *jihad* means struggle, it can be done by hand or verbally. (Amrozi, a interviewer)²⁰

Amrozi also has the aim of carrying out this *jihad* is to uphold the truth and eradicate disobedience, as the statement below:

The *jihadi* fought to uphold the truth and eradicate disobedience with all the capabilities it possessed in order to achieve the love and pleasure of Allah. One of the hadiths that is always touted is "Whoever witnesses the denial before his eyes should change the situation with his hands. If he is unable, then he should be changed verbally. If he is unable then he should be changed with his heart. Know that this is the weakness of faith" (HR. Muslim).²⁰

In fact, Amrozi are convinced that people who die a martyr for *jihad* were included, as well as a statement as follows:

The most important thing is how we all respond to the incident with courage, patience and trust. We leave all these matters to God, because Allāh owns, maintains, regulates, and decides. *Insha Allāh abi* was ready for everything what happened. What is more important is that we are all pleased with this decision and Allah is pleased, because life is only seeking the pleasure of God, others are not ...! What we end up with is, how do we end up living with (*shaheed*) / *husn al-khatimah*) Do not regret the items that have been lost, how many people in this world are dressed but later in the naked world (not clothed). It's better for us to be poor in the world, but in the hereafter full of enjoyment God willing. Face this reality and show this courage to anyone. We leave it to other matters. (*Indopost*, February 27, 2003, 1)²²

In connection with understanding the doctrine of the Bali Bombing Trio of *jihad*, if traced from the ideological roots in the Islamic discourse (Jainuri, 2003)²³ many people associate the *jihad* doctrine with the ideology of terrorism, which in Christianity is equated with the Crusades (Jainuri, 2003) Khadduri, 1966).²⁴ There are 35 times the word *jihad* is mentioned in the Qur'an (Kassis, 1983).²⁵ In the Islamic tradition, *jihad* has a variety of meanings and is

broadly divided into two concepts. *First*, the concept of the struggle of Muslims against lust (*jihad al-nafs / jihad al-akbar*). *Second*, the political concept which is interpreted as "just war" (*jihād al-asghar*). According to Bonney, the two concepts that are side by side are always changing and developing all the time. *First*, at the beginning of Islam when the borders of the Islamic territory did not yet exist, *jihad* was interpreted as a concept of war. But the meaning of this *jihad* changed when the Islamic government was established and had determined the boundaries of its territory. The next process, the Islamic world is recognized and in fact lives in harmony with neighboring countries which are not Muslim. He asserted that the use of the concept of the early *jihad* of Islam to define the meaning of "war" in the modern era of Islam was anachronistic, as well as damaging the reputation of Islam (Bonney, 2004).²⁶

In classical Islamic law theory, the war takes place between *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* until the first defeats the second. The state of war should have ended, along with the disappearance of *Dar al-Harb*. At this stage, *Dar al-Islām* upholds peace and exercises power in an area. Therefore, it can be asserted that the main aim of Islam is to achieve permanent peace rather than continuing a war. So, *jihad* in Islamic theory, is a legitimate tool for the time being to achieve the ideal order of society according to Islam through efforts to change from *Dar al-Harb* to *Dar al-Islām*. In practice, contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, both personal and official, is carried out in a peaceful manner, despite the wars in other regions between Muslims and other countries. So, at the same time, the two conditions as mentioned above, *Dar al-Islām* and *Dar al-Harb* continue.

To understand the meaning of *jihad* and its status in Islamic teachings, one must also look at aspects of Islamic belief in the historical context, relating to the emergence of *jihad*. Therefore, differences among scholars in understanding texts about *jihad* are understandable. Scholars may agree on some things, but not on others, including how they interpret the word *jihad*. Differences in

some aspects of Islamic teachings have long existed and may need to be considered, if consensus (*ijmā'*) is always seen as the only way of looking at understanding Islamic doctrine. In the Qur'an, the jurists classify the meaning of *jihad* in four stages: first, spreading Islam in a peaceful and non-confrontational way (al-Qur'an, 15: 85, 94); second, facing the infidels with argumentation (al-Qur'an, 16: 125; 29: 46); third, fighting infidels with certain conditions (al-Qur'an, 22: 39; 2: 193); fourth, fighting unbelievers unconditionally (al-Qur'an, 2: 244) (Motahhari, 1988). Rueven Firestone provides another view of the theory of evolution of this *jihad* and proposes a different classification (Firestone, 1999). *First*, the classification of the verse deals with non-militant ways of spreading and defending Islam, especially aimed at *ahl al-kitāb*, as in al-Qur'an, (29:46) and (42:15) it is emphasized that the Prophet and the Muslims have no role to impose punishment or wage war with Islam's opponents, such as the Jews and Christians: "Our Lord and your Lord are one, and only to Him we surrender." This principle which then accumulates in the verses of the Qur'an, (109: 6): "for you your religion and for me my religion," which is understood as a teaching principle that accepts plurality, even though the original intention was to provide a solution of the unbridgeable difference between Islam and belief in the disbelievers of the Quraysh of Mecca (Sachedina, 2001; Friedmann, 2000). *Second*, the classification of verses that provide boundaries on the battlefield, for example the Qur'an, (2: 190), "fight in the way of Allah against those who fight you, but do not exceed the limits, because Allah does not like those who transgress." These restrictions include a prohibition on killing women, children and civilians, as well as a ban on warfare in certain months. *Third*, the classification of verses which is considered still a debate between the commandments of God and the response of Muslims, including the most among other classifications of verses (al-Qur'an, 2: 216; 3: 156, 167-168; 4: 72-75, 77, 95; 9: 38-39, 42). *Fourth*, the classification of verses which expressly

commands war in the way of God. Therefore, the Qur'an (2: 191) is one of the verses that is often quoted by hardline Islamic groups to justify their attacks on non-Muslims in order to establish the Islamic government.

In general, the meaning of *jihad* creates two important groups, both among the *ulama* and the majority. The Maliki religious scholars understand *jihad* in its moderate form. For the *fuqaha* of Imam Abu Sufyan al-Thawri (Syria), Ibn Shibrimah (Medina), and other Imam Maliki *Madhab*, including the founder of the *Madhab* himself, Imam Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), *jihad* is not an aspects of the principal teachings (*al-asl*) which determines the nature of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Instead, they understand *jihad* as non-aggressive principles, such as reconciliation, peace, helping each other to achieve interests based on justice, openness, truth and religious freedom. Al-Thawri goes even further in saying that "fighting the idolaters is not an obligation unless they are the ones who started it. If that is the case, then they must be fought as commanded by Allah, if they (infidels) fight you, kill them likewise another word and fight the infidels all, if they fight you (Bonney, 2004)²⁷ For moderate streams of classical *fuqaha*, infidels don't show an aggressive act against others belief is a matter of faith, which in a verse from the *Madaniyah* letter asserts that "there is no compulsion in religion" (al-Qur'an, 2: 285).

This verse is interpreted as having a broader meaning than just the acknowledgment of someone's freedom to embrace his own religion. Non-Muslims living in *Dar al-Islām* must be given the freedom to live and practice their religious teachings without interference from other parties, including from the government. Supporters of this school generally came from the *Hijāz* scholars (Mecca and Medina) in the second century *Hijriyah*, who were basically the successors to the tradition of reforming Islamic law at the end of the first *Hijriyah* century in Medina, namely Sa'īd ibn al-Musayyab (d. 94/712), and his close student and friend 'Atā' ibn Abī Rabāh (d. 114/732). Their views on

peace and war in Islam were accepted and reinterpreted by subsequent *fuqaha*, including Ibn Jurayh (d.150 / 767), 'Amr ibn Dinār (d. 172/788), founder of the Madhīlī Mādī, Mālik ibn Anas, and others. For these *fuqaha*, the disbelievers should not be fought because of their beliefs. Because this would conflict with freedom of religion, a universal principle that is explicitly stated in the teachings of Islam. For these *fuqaha*, wars such as those mentioned in the Qur'ān can only be fought against the pagan Arabs at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This provision does not apply to *Ahl al-Kitab* (Jews and Christians), *Magi*, and even non-Arabic infidels. However, they have no objection to calling *jihad* against the infidels who are legitimately identified as enemies of Islam. This war against them is not only justified but also legitimate if the unbelievers themselves first start aggression and tyranny against Muslims (al-Qur'an, 2: 190, 193; 8:39).

For most classical scholars, especially in the second century *Hijri*, perceptions of disbelief in the al-Qur'ān are always associated with injustice (*zulm*), oppression ('*udwan*), and slander. This view leads to the general assumption that all disbelievers are enemies of Islam, without further investigation whether they are truly advocates of injustice, oppression and slander or not. Two figures from the Hanafi school of thought, al-Shaybānī (132/749 or 750-189 / 805) and al-Sarakhsī (400/1010 - 482/1090) are an important figure from hardliners about *jihad* (Bonney, 2004).²⁸ In contrast to the above view, for radicalists from the "hardliners" group, the possibility of making peace with the infidels is a difficult attitude to accept. This view is based on the assumption that the war orders mentioned in the al-Qur'ān totally erased non-aggressive verses in the al-Qur'ān, including texts that encourage Muslims to make peace (al-Qur'an, 8: 61). Among the important figures who support the latter opinion are some of the scholars of Basrah and the Qatada *mufasssir*, famous for Abū al-Khattab (60 / 679-117 / 735), who say that al-Qur'ān (8:61) has been removed (*mansuh*) by the verse which commands war (al-Qur'ān, 9: 5). Because

peace or diplomatic solutions cannot be implemented, *jihad* is a strong basis for the policy of Muslim relations with the non-Muslim world. *Jihad* for fighting against non-Muslims is a religious and political consequence that must be implemented. Muslims remain obliged to wage unconditional warfare against non-Muslims until the latter embraces Islam or pays taxes, as commanded by the al-Qur'ān (9:29), as a sign of surrender and loyalty to Muslim rules (Jani, 1998). 29 Al-Shafi'i was the first to formulate the doctrine of *jihad* to fight the infidels because of their *kufir* (Al-Shafi'i, 1904). 30 On this basis the *jihad* was later transformed as a collective obligation (*fard kifāyah*) for Muslims to fight the infidels. This legal basis caused debate among followers of al-Shafi'i Madhhab and gave rise to differing views among the Hanafi *fuqoha* schools of thought. Tahawi (w 321/933), closer to the early Hanafi doctrine, said that war could be fought only if there was a conflict with the infidels (Al-Tahawi, 1950). 31 But Sarakhsi, the great commentator of Shaybānī's works, accepted al-Shāfi'i's doctrine that fighting the infidels was "a permanent task until the end of time" (Al-Sarakhsi, 1906). 32 Some people who came later accepted this opinion and made it a normative basis for carrying out *jihad* of war.

Quraisy Shihab states about the true meaning of *jihad*. *First*, the verses that use the word "jihad" must be distinguished from the verses that use the word "qital". "Qital" is a war using weapons. *Uqtulu* was killed, but did not have to use weapons. *Second*, the verses that govern the fight read: "Fight those who are fighting you" and "Fight wherever they meet" to be heeded and should not be confused with the meaning of *jihad* as "a genuine effort in various fields" with *jihad* as "the command to fight in the cause of God". Especially in the Qur'ān, it needs to be underlined that the nature of Muslims is reluctant to fight. This is written in Surat al-Baqarah 216 and it has been agreed by scholars and Bali Bombers that Muslims have always disliked war. Actually, according to references, some say in the history of the Prophet it was challenged to

fight more than 70 times, but he took up arms and led the war no more than 3 times, namely the battles of Badr, Uhud and Hunain. Even then, in self-defense (*defensive*), because Muslims still like to solve the problem with the deliberations and hold a peace agreement as Hudaibiya. Likewise, Azyumardi Azra means that *jihad* is very broad in understanding. *Jihad* is derived from the word *jahada* which means to be serious. And from this word then arises and develops into *ijtihad*, *ijtihād*, that is to mean to produce the best thought. So, *jihad* means all the best and most genuine business charity (Metro TV, 2006).

As for Ali Ghufron, he understands *jihad* as a form of love of a group of Muslims to Allah and vice versa, in the hadith of the Messenger of Allah: "During this world until the Day of Judgment, it has been provided and prepared that there are groups that have the characteristics: Allah loves them and they love God." And he also stressed, that *jihad* is no other meaning except war:

Jihad is war, there is no other meaning. Maybe my *ustadh* understood more about this *jihad*, but I also understood that the instructions of the *jihad* were very clear. The Prophet in his entire life only once, 'Umrah only two or three times, but the war 77 times, even though the Prophet Muhammad was ours, and it is obliged upon you to fight, while that war you hate. Yet clearly the Qur'ān says "Fight those who have fought you and not overstepped your bounds. Surely I do not like people who exceed the limits (al-Qur'an, al-Nisa, IV: 76)." *Jihad* in the context of upholding the religion of Allah is always accompanied by the word " *fi sabīl Allāh* "to distinguish between war in Islam and war because of group fanaticism, arrogance, greed, and other ambitions." (Ali Ghufron, Metro TV interview, November 26, 2005)³³

He provided the basis for his argument by quoting verses from the Qur'ān

and exemplifying the use of the word *jihad*, as follows:

Likewise the term *jihad*, he stressed because it has become the term of *Shari'a* as mentioned above, then if there are words of *jihad* which its form absolutely means to stand alone (not attributed to something else) then it means "war" (fighting the infidels that there is no binding agreement to elevate the sentence of Allah. He also exemplified the Qur'an surah al-Tahrīm (66: 9) in that verse there are words *jāhid al-kuffār wa al-munāfiqīn* the word "*jāhid*" is a command form of the word *jihād* then the correct meaning and purpose according to the *shar'i* is "*fight the infidels and the hypocrites*". "It cannot be translated with the meaning of language, for example "*Be serious you face unbelievers and hypocrites*". He strengthened his argument by stating that the translation was the same as the Qur'an and its translation issued by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion. (Ghufron, 2003)32.

In terms of etymology, Ali Ghufron clearly explains the definition of *jihad*, both in language and terms. He quotes from the Arabic Dictionary *Lisān al-'Arab*, Ibn Manzur, juz IV:

The word "*jihad*" has two definitions or meanings, namely etymology and terminology. Etymologically, "*jihad*" comes from the Arabic word *ginger - yujahidu - jihādan* and means to struggle or struggle that is done earnestly or earnestly devotes all abilities and strengths that exist to achieve something that is loved and avoid something that is hated. In other words, "*jihad*" is the mobilization of all strength, both in the form of words and actions in battle. The word "*jahd*" or "*juhd*" means strength, power or ability, also means *masyaqqah* (difficulty or difficulty) the word "*jahd*" is the same as the words "*thaqah*" and "*wus*" (strength or

ability). The words "*jahada-yajhadu-jahdan*" and "*ijtahāda*" mean the same as the word "*jadda*" (earnest). While understanding the terminology, he added if the word "*jihad*" is associated with the word "*fi sabīl Allāh*" means to fight the infidels who are not there is binding agreement and fighting Muslims with the aim of upholding the sentence of Allah." (Ghufron, 2003).34

In responding to the Bali Bombers, Shihab assessed that the perpetrators might have been too eager to fight, but their religious knowledge was weak, especially interpretation. What must not be forgotten from the principle of religion is the love of all nature (*mercy li al-'ālamīn*) and is very tolerant of others. The passionate *jihad* of the spirit by forgetting other principles, the person fails in *jihad* to face his own lust so that it is not called *jihad* and his death is not *jihad* in the way of God, but in the path of lust. In fact what must be thought is the lust called the greatest *jihad*. Because there are people who *jihad*, but are based on emotion and anger that is not said *jihad*. The greatest *jihad* is to combat his own anger. As for the relationship with moderate and extreme thoughts in religion, Syafiq A. Mughni (2005)35 states that there are two moderates. *First*, moderate in the sense of thought, is still based on the Qur'an and Sunnah, but understands it as a whole principle of moderation so that it does not fall into extremity. Because extremism will occur, if we only hold on to parts of the Qur'an but ignore other verses of the Qur'an. Anything extreme, be it extreme left or extreme right, are all the same. The actual character of the teachings of Islam is indeed moderate as that, but do not be interpreted to compromise the teachings of Islam with the teachings of other religions, namely defeating the teachings of Islam with others, but must hold on to the totality of the teachings of Islam itself. *Second*, moderate as a method of movement, so *manhaj* movement. If a movement is based on the benefits of the people, it should try to change that society slowly, but surely.

In fact there are various meanings of *jihad* that arise from the understanding of various groups in Muslim societies themselves. The difference is not only related to the definition, its existence now and when the *jihad* was carried out, but it also relates to how the *jihad* must be performed. Indeed, it cannot be denied that *jihad* is also interpreted to be the same as war, which in the contemporary era was carried out with terror in the form of suicide bombings. However, if examined further *jihad* is an obligation to strive to do good and to escape from the domination of the heresy so that *jihad* is the duty of every individual. Secondly, if *jihad* is interpreted as a physical struggle in the form of war against the infidels, then the war is carried out in order to defend themselves and boundaries - the limits are carried out not only on the targets and targets of the war which are generally civilians: women, children, parents, and priests, but also when the war is waged. From this it is clear that not necessarily a war against non-Muslims can be carried out, for no apparent reason. At the very least, if the conditions such as injustice, oppression, and slander befall those Muslims are fulfilled, then war can be waged. This condition is then used by Imam Samudra to do *jihad*, using bomb terrorism, to fight oppression and eliminate slander (Samudra, 2004).³⁶

Imam Samudra understands that *jihad* is a war against infidels who fight Islam and Muslims, as in his statement:

In terms of the language (etymology), is simple *jihad* means serious, pouring a right energy to achieve the goal. In this case, someone who is serious about finding a trace can be categorized as *jihad*. In terms of terms, *jihad* means to seriously strive for Allah's law, preach it and enforce it. In terms of the term (terminology) *shar'i*, *jihad* means fighting against the infidels who are fighting Islam and Muslims. This definition of *shar'i* is better known as "*jihad*" *fi sabīl Allāh*". As I recall, the three definitions above have become *ijmā*

'(consensus) of the scholars of the *salaf al-shālih*, especially from among the four schools of thought (Shafi'i, Hambali, Māliki, Hanafi). So there is no disagreement in terms of defining *jihad*. (Ocean, 2003 interview)

In fact, he suggested to deepen the understanding of *jihad*, to read *al-Jihād Sabīlunā* by Shaikh Abd al-Bāqi Ramdūn, *Kitāb al-Jihād* by Shaikh Ibn al-Mubārak, *Fī Tarbiyah al-Jihādiyah wa al-Binā* by Shaikh al-Shah 'Abd Allāh' Azzām and other *Kitāb ulamā 'āmilīn*. (Ocean, *I Fight Terrorists*, 108). He stressed:

If any evil and disobedience are met, it must be completely eradicated with his own hands. In fact, he believes that the most correct understanding of *jihad* is that which he himself understands. *Jihad* is the greatest worship, let alone *jihad fi sabīl Allāh*. Prayers, the pilgrimage is not the greatest worship, but the *jihad* is the highest worship, there is no other worship that is higher than the *jihad*. *Jihad* is an important word in Islam and according to him the meaning is only singular namely war. *Jihad* is fighting against the unbelievers who fight Islamists, it cannot be *manipulated* anymore. He must do justice, that is "*wadh'u shai'in 'alā makānihi*" ie to put things in their place. Nothing more or less then we must uphold. (Ocean, 2003 interview)

Of the three terms that are understood Imam Samudra are earnest, fight, and fight against the infidels who fight Islām and the Muslims, he is more likely to understand *jihād* such as war. And this understanding which he considers to be the most correct and cannot be changed because it is already considered standard or fixed. Because only *jihād* which means war is the highest worship, no worship exceeds the height and glory of that worship. Moreover, if it is associated with infidels who fight Islām. According to him, a fair and balanced if people Islām then retaliated infidels (United States and its allies) are

already fighting them, the war met with war, blood for blood. This *jih ā d* is what Imam Samudra understood.

In the contemporary Islamic era, both groups of understanding of *jihad*, both "soft" and "hard," actually have the same reason that physical *jihad* is carried out because of causes or actions which are detrimental to Muslims. Among some hardliners, there are indeed those who use the reason to advance the war by ignoring the cause and effect factor relationships. They are more literal basis "verse wars of war" (*āyāt al-sayf*: al-Qur'ān, 9: 39,123; 2: 190; 39:79), which is considered normatively to have legal power compared to the same verses which came first, which is in the tradition of understanding the teachings of Islam is called *naskh-mansukh*. Some Muslims criticize this way of understanding and claim that it is Allah who has the right to erase and enforce His will. In Him is the source of all revelations (al-Qur'ān, 13:39). Although in the Qur'an itself there are references that explain changes (al-Qur'an, 2: 106; 16: 101), or the replacement of revelations by other revelations, the Qur'ān itself does not explain the *naskh* theory. The general meaning of *naskh* is to abolish original teachings or rules, while the original word is still written in the Manuscripts, and in fact the two groups of texts still exist in the Qur'ān, this situation is confusing for certain circles. This confusion begets another understanding of *naskh* theory, those who have this understanding states that the *naskh* is basically a logical process and is needed to practice the Qur'anic text precisely, due to conditions, and postpone the practice of other texts until environmental conditions allow it to be implemented (Al-Naim, 1990). So, related to the verses that are the source of the ideology of *jihad*, which, as discussed above, all of them remain valid, the practice of which depends on the conditions that require it.

The interpretation of *jihad* as practiced by some hardliners in the Muslim community is also a common tendency among Western Orientalists to link terrorism to the concept of *jihad* that trapped itself in

understanding the concept of *jihad* and only bases it on the limitations of subjective abilities and interests. So in fact, between hardliners Muslim and the Western Orientalists have the same understanding of *jihad*. They understood it literally and only took one meaning from the many interpretations of *jihad*. Such understanding is very contrary to their own scientific traditions, which upholds the breadth of views and the spirit of plurality in understanding something. Among them was Pipe, Mac Arthur who interpreted *jihad* as the same as fighting non-Muslims (Pipe, 2002; Mac Arthur, 2001). This tendency of understanding is indeed one of the prominent features of the Orientalists in understanding Islam (Southern, 1962). This inaccurate understanding of Islam and Muslim societies has been used as a foothold by the Western regime's rulers in establishing relations with the Muslim world. As a result, the West-East relations in a very long period are more prominent marked by conflict and mutual suspicion (Daniel, 1960). This fact makes several Western academic groups criticize this imbalance of relations and try to align the Western understanding of Islam and Muslim societies proportionally and objectively (Said, 1979). Even though they are a small group, their influence continues to grow and develop, especially in the university environment.

Finally, this research on the doctrine of *jihad* in the perspective of the Bali Bombers is one of the copies that has sought to uncover the teachings of *jihad* that were understood by Amrozi, Ali Ghufron and Imam Samudra. The understanding of *jihad* as a normative basis for physical struggle is enriched by the social, political, economic, cultural and religious conditions of Muslim communities in areas of the majority Muslim population. The normative aspect of the *jihad* teachings becomes the basic foundation for creating justice, eliminating oppression and slander.

II. CONCLUSION

This research reveals that interpretation the doctrine of *jihad* according perpetrators of Bom Bali is a reductive interpretation. They emphasis only hold on to parts of the Qur'an but ignore other verses of the Qur'an and took only one meaning from the various interpretations of *jihad*. When they interpreted *Jihad* only as war, the substantive meaning of *jihad* became vague. With regard, the term of *jihad* became negative connotation that identic with terror. Moreover, the interpretation is very radical that appose the majority of moderate Muslim scholar. They hold that *jihad* has very broad and profound understanding. The historical context and the principle of religion such as love, mercy, harmony, peace and tolerant of others should be taken into consideration. The passionate spirit of *jihad* by forgetting other principles and the context, the person fails in *jihad* to face his own lust so that it is not called *jihad* and his death is not *jihad* in the way of God, but in the path of lust.

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