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\*Corresponding author: Zora Arfina Sukabdi, School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia, Jl. Salemba Raya No.4, Kenari, Senen, DKI Jakarta, Jakarta Pusat 10430, Indonesia  
E-mail: [zora.arfina@ui.ac.id](mailto:zora.arfina@ui.ac.id)

Reviewing editor:  
Ana Maria Lopez Narbona, University of Malaga: Universidad de Malaga, Spain

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## SOCIOLOGY | RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia

Zora Arfina Sukabdi<sup>1\*</sup>, Muhammad Adlin Sila<sup>2</sup>, Chandra Yudistira Purnama<sup>3</sup>, Fathul Lubabin Nuqul<sup>4</sup>, Seta Ariawuri Wicaksana<sup>5</sup>, Ali Abdullah Wibisono<sup>1</sup> and Yanwar Arief<sup>6</sup>

**Abstract:** Islamophobia has its long historical roots. Nonetheless, religiously motivated terrorism and the use of the name “Islam” by terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) may have amplified Islamophobia. Islamophobia has caused violence against Muslims in several stages and contexts. This study was held to investigate whether Islamophobia could also happen among Muslims in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia, as the majority Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Using quantitative method of analysis, the study formulated the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) and involved 509 participants. The findings show that 92% of Muslims in Indonesia do not demonstrate any sign of Islamophobia. Nonetheless, 7.67% shows prejudice, fear, and rejection toward certain Islamic symbols, religious traditions, and Muslims with distinguished appearance which may be associated with terrorists’ outfits.

**Subjects:** Cross Cultural Psychology; Prejudice; Religion; Sociology & Social Policy

**Keywords:** Islamophobia; Indonesia; prejudice; stigmatization; hatred; fear; discrimination

## 1. Introduction

Islamophobia has its long historical roots (Esposito, 2019). Nevertheless, the tragedy of the WTC 9/11 2001 which uses the terms “jihad” or “Islam” has worsened the situation (Dauda, 2020). The tragedy has caused trauma for all the global citizens, and Islam has been strongly linked to the attack as Osama bin Laden along with his network, Al-Qaeda, used (or ‘hijacked’) the name “Islam” in their claimed action (Wijaya, 2016). The series of “moral panics” have occurred not only in Western society but also in many places in the world as valued universal wisdom (e.g., humanity,

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Zora A. Sukabdi is a forensic psychologist. She invented a 3D-Model of Motivation-Ideology-Capability Terrorism Risk Assessments and Rehabilitation to terrorist offenders, Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF), and families (known as ‘MIKRA’). Zora is a senior lecturer at the School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia.

Muhammad A. Sila is an expert at the Indonesia’s Ministry of Education.

Chandra Y. Purnama is a psychometrician and lecturer at Faculty of Psychology, Jenderal Achmad Yani University.

Fathul Lubabin Nuqul is a lecturer in Faculty of Psychology, Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang.

Seta A. Wicaksana is a Business Psychologist. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology, Pancasila University.

Ali A. Wibisono is a permanent lecturer in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, at Universitas Indonesia.

Yanwar Arief is the Dean Faculty of Psychology in Universitas Islam Riau.

the freedom of expression, gender equality, or tolerance) are threatened by the actions of “some” Muslims in the phenomenon of terrorism (e.g., Al-Qaeda, ISIS) (Rachman, 2018; Sayyid, 2014; Wijaya, 2010). Accordingly, since the 9/11 attack Islamophobia has not only been growing strongly in America but also in Australia, Europe, Asia, and Africa (Adam, Vacariu, and Cruz, 2019, Rachman, 2018). Consequently, general Muslims become targets of (symbolic/physical) violence or abuses (Dauda, 2020).

Islamophobic violence against Muslims has emerged in different patterns, such as verbal abuse, physical assaults, shootings, murders, bombings, and destruction of Islam’s sacred symbols (e.g., mosques, schools, Islamic centers, schools, clothes, Muslim tombs) and communities (Dauda, 2020; Runnymede Trust, 1997; Sway, 2005). On the other hand, the rise in the intensity of violence towards Islamic faith and Muslims is largely presented in the wide scale of negative narratives of Islam in the mass media, literature, and public discussions which would threaten peaceful co-existence around the world (Dauda, 2020; Rachman, 2018, Wijaya, 2016). The definition of Islam in the Western media, for example, is closely associated with the distorted meanings, sentiment, and stigma (Rachman, 2018; Wijaya, 2010). George Gerbner in his article “Violence and Terror in and by Media” in 1992 criticizes the role of media in promoting terrorism. He argues that media is effectively selling terrorism and violence as commodities (Ibrahim & Romli, 2007).

Global counterterrorism efforts have brought positive and negative impacts. They increase the people’s awareness and the level of security around the world. On the other hand, they intensify demonization contents toward general Muslims (Ibrahim & Romli, 2002) or public opinions which are favorable to labelling/name calling (e.g., “towel heads”, “camel riders”, “radicals”), accusation, and character assassination (Wijaya, 2010). The stigmatization is seen as the “side effect” of the war on terror (Wijaya, 2010).

Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate Islamophobia (Iner & Nebhan, 2019). “Location” has been a critical point which would explain the Islamophobic experience. For instance, within a Western context, the propagation of anti-Muslim racism and marginalization are reported in public, political, and academic forums (Iner & Nebhan, 2019). These forums work on the premise that the Islamophobic experience is between “Muslim” and “non-Muslim”. Nevertheless, there are also similar discriminatory behaviours, racism, and prejudices among Muslims (of some Muslims towards other Muslims) in Muslim communities, called as “internalized oppression” (Tyrer, 2013), “Islamophobia from within” (Pyke, 2010), or “internal Islamophobia”. The internalized oppression, according to Iner and Nebhan (2019), occurs as a result of Western media propaganda. Moreover, it could also be the impact of colonialism and secularism (Iner & Nebhan, 2019).

The internalized oppression/internal Islamophobia could be demonstrated through intercommunal racism, sexism, and criticism of “particular Muslim practices” (e.g., certain outfits, rituals, traditions, religious identification) which are “negatively seen” by the Western Islamophobic discourse (Iner & Nebhan, 2019). The hijab (Muslims’ appearance), for example, often becomes the topic of Islamophobic discourses. This is not only because of Muslim women being a minority community in non-Muslim societies/countries but also their “visibility” (Imtoul, 2003). The visibility could be provoking the notion of “Muslim women being oppressed and victims of abuse, hence they might be able to handle hostilities/negativity”, according to Imtoul (2003). Several discussions related to the hijab are usually centered on topics such as “Hijab: to ban or not to ban?” or “Muslim women: oppressed or liberated?” (Dreher & Ho, 2009).

I actually found that more common. Internal Islamophobia from Muslim to Muslim. From in my personal experience, it is more common. I have to fend off and explain myself more to Muslims than I have to non-Muslims. And my children as well. (Alia in Iner & Nebhan, 2019, p. 202)

The present study sought to examine if Islamophobia could also happen among Muslims in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia. It aimed to understand the Indonesian Muslims' reaction or even prejudice toward one another. The study's hypothesis is that Islamophobia significantly occurs among the majority Muslims in Indonesia as the Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Involving 509 participants from at least seven cities in Indonesia, the study also developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) and applied quantitative analysis. The study is to understand how study could contribute to the literature on Islamophobia. It could also inspire counterterrorism practitioners to manage a softer approach in counter-narrative programs which would prevent prejudices or stigma that may jeopardize peaceful coexistence.

## **2. The distorted meaning, sentiment, and stigma towards Islam**

The use of the word "Islam" by extremists to legitimate their terrorist acts had activated many westerners and beyond to fear Muslims and label Islam as a threat (Cipriani, 2019). Supporting Cipriani's argument, Abubakar (2019) explains that the major cause of Islamophobia is because extremists hijack Islam/hide underneath the name of Islam in their actions. These extremists twist the religious texts for justifying their agenda to cause instability and mayhem, and destroy peaceful society (Abubakar, 2019). Other causes include 1) Orientalists' perceptions of Islam; 2) poor knowledge of Islam; 3) hate speeches by public figures; 4) the rise of Islamophobia industry; 5) fear of domination; and 6) public anxiety over immigrants/immigration programs (Dauda, 2020).

The presentation of Islam is demonstrated in four different "theaters" (Sayyid, 2014, p. 3). The first theatre is "Muslimistan" which is a collection of countries socially and culturally dominated (informally or formally) by the "Islamicate". Islam has some constitutional privilege in this regard; for instance, Islam is expressed as a state religion. Countries where a huge percentage of the population would define themselves as Muslim are included in this type of theater (Sayyid, 2014). The second theater is Muslims as a clear minority and might be marginalized by the national narrative although their existence was prior to the formation of the state; for instance, the Muslims of China, India, Russia, and Thailand. The third theater is Muslims as mainly immigrants in territories such as Western countries. The fourth theatre is Muslims as negligible/unrecognized, therefore Islamophobia is performed indirectly or virtually. For instance, the Muslims in South America or large parts of Central Africa. These four contexts/theaters determine distinctive forms of Islamophobia (Sayyid, 2014).

The distorted meaning of Islam has been studied by several authors. Ridouani (2011), in his study titled "The Representation of Arabs and Muslims in Western Media", explains that the distorted definitions of Islam and Muslims in the mainstream media began decades ago. Moreover, paintings which discredit Islam have been created hundreds ago (Rachman, 2018). Ramji's (2005) study titled "From Navy Seals to The Siege: Getting to Know the Muslim Terrorist, Hollywood Style" also describes how Islam is portrayed in American media and Hollywood. Some of these descriptions might be accurate, yet some are inaccurate (Rachman, 2018).

The sentiment and stigma towards Islam and Muslims are captured in statements in the media (e.g., Muhammad is described as a figure who is hungry for blood, nonetheless the prophet never killed anyone in his life) (Rachman, 2018). John Hagee, the founder of Christian United for Israel (CUFI), argued that the USA is in the war against Islam (Rachman, 2018). In 2010, Terry Jones who claimed himself as a priest in a church of Gainesville, Florida, declared "International Burn the Quran Day" (Majid, 2012). Roger Williams, a leader of baptism in Rhode Island, USA, defines Islam as a religion of sensuality, dishonesty, despotism, and ignorance, while the true meaning of the word Islam is actually "peace" and Muslims are forbidden to practice any type of "two-faces" ("*munafiq*"), oppressions, lethargy, and adultery (Rachman, 2018). Furthermore, Rod Parsley in his book "Silent No More" (2005) describes Islam as a religion of Anti-Christ, yet the Quran (the sacred text in Islam) mentions Jesus 25 times and Mary 34 times (whereas it only mentions Mohammed 4 times) and asks Muslims to respect Jesus as one of the God's messengers (Takawi & Reynolds, 2020).

Majid (2012) explains that people can become famous (at least, getting attention) after insulting Islam and Muslims. For example, Franklin Graham became famed for stating that Islam is a very malevolent and wicked religion, and Pat Robertson for portraying Mohammed as a wild-eyed fanatic, a thief, and a killer. Another example, John Farwell was popular for calling the prophet a terrorist on national television.

### 3. Indicators of Islamophobia

Phobia is a consistent distress towards an object (Moordiningsih, 2004). Anxiety in a phobia occurs when a person faces an object or situation which he/she is afraid of; therefore, the person would avoid the object/situation (De Clerq, 1994). The act of avoidance becomes the main indicator of a phobia, or in this case, Islamophobia (De Clerq, 1994; Moordiningsih, 2004). The study of Islamophobia is placed on stereotypes, prejudices, and fears towards Muslims within a mainly Western context (Iner & Nebhan, 2019).

Islamophobia is combined words: “Islam” and “phobia”. The word “Islam” is Arabic which means a belief system that reflects a total and voluntary submission to God Almighty and the systems of the universe He has created (Dauda, 2020). The word “phobia” means fear of something due to the danger thought/perceived to be associated with it (Dauda, 2020). Therefore, Islamophobia implies uninformed fear associated with Islam. Islamophobia is used to describe the negative stereotypes, hatred, and hostility committed toward Muslims or Islamic symbols because of inappropriate perceptions about Islam. The hostility includes hate speech, intimidation and marginalization, harassment, discrimination, verbal and physical attacks, torture, murder, bombing, arson and vandalism, kidnapping, demonstrations, rallies, and marches against Islam and other objects/subjects (e.g., Muslims, buildings) related to Islam (Dauda, 2020).

Scholars propose different conceptual understandings of the term “Islamophobia” (Dauda, 2020). The term “Islamophobia” appears due to the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in the past decades (Moordiningsih, 2004). Anti-Muslim prejudice is based on a claim that Islam is an “inferior” religion which becomes a threat against values in society (Abdel-Hady, 2004). The use of the term is helpful to target inappropriate/false perceptions on Islam and Muslims and develop peaceful co-existence, according to Young European Muslims (2002).

The protuberant use of the concept of Islamophobia has increased after the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia’s (CBMI) report titled “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All” (1997). According to this Commission, Islamophobia defines as “unfounded hostility towards Islam and practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities” (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, Kumar (2018) explains that daily acts of hate crimes, hostility, and discrimination (e.g., in employment, health services) against Muslims are the obvious manifestations of Islamophobia. Islamophobia also includes prejudices (*cognition*) and dislike (*affection/attitude*) to Islam and Muslims, other than attacks, exclusion/rejection (e.g., from political and governmental posts), discrimination, elimination (*psychomotor*) (Dauda, 2020; Gardell, 2010; Sway, 2005). Hence, Islamophobia is more than the expression of fear or hatred. It also is expressed in many forms of discrimination such as in policies, gestures, and speeches (Baker & Peter, 2004).

Islamophobia is an institutionalized and systemic racism and discrimination against anyone perceived to be associated with Islam (e.g., people with certain appearance/outfits); a hatred or fear of Islam; and prejudice/hostility towards Muslims (Abdulhadi, 2018, p. 14). Nevertheless, there is no biological locus for Muslims or Muslims are not defined by a “race”; hence, Islamophobia would not be towards a subject given by nature (unlike classical discriminatory practices) (Sayyid, 2014). In a larger context, Abadi (2018) explains the use of harsh talk, elimination of Muslim voices, discriminatory condemnation, constant embarrassment at public places (e.g., airports), Muslim ban, and selective surveillance and policing as samples of behaviors of Islamophobia. Further, Islamophobia is widely spread in most countries driven by the fear of Islam of some

world leaders (Dauda, 2020). Cipriani (2019) describes that Islamophobia is represented in physical or verbal attacks on places of worship, people, and property; troll or bullying on social media; policies by governments or their legislations which indirectly only affect Muslims; and discrimination in education, housing, employment, or access to services. Other manifestations of Islamophobia include religious and ethnic profiling, police abuse, and negative statements by politicians which stigmatize Muslims as “terrorists” and disregard their positive contributions (e.g., paying taxes) to the communities/countries where they live (Dauda, 2020).

In Europe, Nielsen and Allen (2002) define the general signs of Islamophobia. They include acts of violence (e.g., verbal abuse, harassment, and aggression) towards Muslim women, those who look like Muslims (e.g., Singh, Arab descent), asylum seekers, and Islamic cultural centers. Identifying the behavior indicators of Islamophobia is to understand the behaviors include in the term ‘Islamophobia’ (Sayyid, 2014). Furthermore, Sayyid (2014) describes Islamophobic behavior indicators in six main clusters. The first, according to him, is attacks on persons who are perceived to be Muslims, which include pushing, shouting abuse, spitting, various forms of beating, pulling hijabs from Muslim women, and murder. The second is attacks on assets/properties linked to Muslims (e.g., cemeteries, mosques, working places). The third is acts of intimidation which can be systematically organized by a number of persons. This includes demonstrations against the building of cultural centers or mosques, marches in the areas of large Muslim populations, the burning of the Qur’an, and black campaigns on Islam. What distinguishes the cluster of these behaviors is the level of coordination which requires the expenditure of socio-economic capital. The fourth is Islamophobia in institutional settings where Muslims receive systematic discrimination or less favorable treatment than others in similar positions within the same groups/organizations (e.g., discriminating distribution of tasks, biased assessments of performance, bullying, harassment, pointed jokes). Other behaviors such as forcing particular foods (e.g., pork, alcohol) to Muslims with the understanding of Islam, or particular dress code which places a burden on Muslims (e.g., Santa Clause’s dress during Christmas, miniskirts, taking off veils/headcovers) are also included in this cluster. The fifth is systematic and constant indirect or direct statements/mocks that ridicule Muslims or Islam in public. For example, publishing the sacred texts (Qur’an) by listing Muhammad or hate speeches on social media by politicians (e.g., websites such as Bare Naked Islam and Jihad Watch). The sixth is Islamophobia facilitated by a state. This cluster includes discriminatory criminal justice system or state policies, security bodies’ gentle refusal to provide necessary protections, active intensification of surveillance to Muslim populations (e.g., using paid informers, information technology, and agent provocateurs), and certain secret/clandestine operations which treat Muslims less favorably than others (Bazian, 2012; Sayyid, 2014).

#### **4. Islamophobia in several countries**

Around the globe (e.g., in the US, Australia, Norway, China, Myanmar, UK, New Zealand, Palestine, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam, Poland, Hungary, Sweden), anti-Islam violence such as hate crimes, rallies, murders of Muslims, and bombings to Mosques and Muslim graveyards, affected by Islamophobia has become a concern (Dauda, 2020; Nielsen & Allen, 2002). Islamophobia has occurred prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks but has amplified (in quantity and quality) in the post-9/11 era (Nielsen & Allen, 2002; Gallup News in Dauda, 2020).

In the US, Islamophobia has not become a usual and constant threat to American Muslims until after the 9/11 attacks (Dauda, 2020). There have been over 1,200 anti-Mosque incidents in the US since 2005 (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2019). Moreover, surveys conducted in Europe reveal that there has been a rise of Islamophobia since 2015 (Osman, 2017). A series of assaults by right-wing nationalists against Muslims have caused the rise of Islamophobia in North America and Europe, and the rise of the Hindu nationalist movement has driven violence against Muslims in India (Osman, 2017). An extensive poll in 2011 demonstrated that 48.6% of Australians had anti-Muslim attitudes (ABC News, 2011); whereas another survey in 2014 revealed that a quarter of Australians had unfavorable/negative attitudes toward Muslims compared to any other religious group (Chalkley-Rhoden, 2014).

**Table 1. Selected Islamophobic-related cases and intolerance around the world, 2001–2019**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Modes of attacks</b>	<b>Victims</b>	<b>Causes</b>
30-04-01	Mawanella, Central Province	Shooting, melee attack	2 killed & 15+ injured; millions of rupees destroyed	Racism; Xenophobia
Oct. 01	Dallas, Texas	Shooting	1 killed	Revenge on the 9/11 terrorist attacks
15-11-01	Mesa, Arizona	Shooting	1 killed	Mistaken for an Arab Muslim
Feb. '03	Qinghai	Mob attacks	100+ Hui Muslims injured/Hui-owned shops & restaurants destroyed	Misunderstanding
12-07-05	Nottingham, England	Melee attack	A Muslim man beaten to death	Anti-Muslim hatred
08-11-06	Malegaon	Bombing	Series of bombs detonated in a Muslim cemetery (37 killed & 125+ injured)	Extremism; Anti-Muslim hatred
26-04-07	Kostroma	Melee attack	2 injured	Racism; Xenophobia
30-06-07	Blackley, England	Stabbing, melee attack	A Muslim religious teacher stabbed	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
10-12-07	Lauingen, Bavaria	Bombing	A Mosque	Anti-Muslim hatred
01-01-08	Sergiyev, Posad	Vandalism	Muslim prayer house destroyed	Racism; Xenophobia
05-02-08	Graz	Vandalism	Close to 60 tombstones of Muslims desecrated	Extremism
07-02-08	Liège	Melee attack	2 women injured	Extremism/Hostility
09-02-08	Columbia, Tennessee	Arson	The Islamic Centre in Columbia was Firebombed	Extremism; Revenge
10–24 March '08	Tibet	2008 Tibetan unrest	Main Mosque in Lasa burned down; 18 killed & 383 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
06-04-08	Arras	Vandalism	148 Muslim graves desecrated	Anti-Muslim hatred
20-04-08	Toulouse	Arson	Al-Salam Mosque destroyed/1 person injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
02-06-08	Copenhagen	Melee attack	Spokesperson of IFS injured	Racism
June '08	Milan	Bombing	Two handmade bombs were thrown at the Islamic Centre	Anti-Muslim hatred
22-08-08	Hastings, England	Melee attack	1 killed & 2+ injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
03-11-08	Lanao del Norte	Shooting	5 killed by Ilaga	Anti-Muslim hatred
01-07-09	Dresden, Saxony	Stabbing	1 killed & 1 injured	Extremism; Anti-Muslim hatred
13-12-09	Castres	Vandalism	Castres Mosque vandalized	Anti-Muslim hatred
10-04-10	Karlovo	Arson	A Mosque burned down	Anti-Muslim hatred

(Continued)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Modes of attacks</b>	<b>Victims</b>	<b>Causes</b>
03-05-10	Nablus	Arson attack	A Mosque in the West Bank destroyed	Xenophobia
10-05-10	Babworth, England	Bombing	Attempt to kill fellow Muslim prisoners	Terrorism; Anti-Muslim hatred
09-06-10	London, England	Melee attack, robbery	A girl was burned and robbed	Anti-Muslim hatred
10-06-10	Zlatoust	Vandalism	15 tombstones of Muslim cemetery desecrated	Anti-Muslim hatred
23-08-10	Simferopol	Vandalism	Seit-Settar Mosque vandalized	Anti-Muslim hatred
24-01-11	Dearborn, Michigan	Attempted car bombing	Bombing plot of Dearborn Mosque	Terrorism
20-03-11	Gainesville, Florida	Burning	Qur'an was burned	Anti-Muslim hatred; 9/11 Anniversary
22-07-11	Oslo & Utøya	Car bombing, shooting	Oslo (8 killed & 209 injured; Utøya (68 killed & 110 injured)	Islamisation of Europe
22-11-11	Mississauga, Ontario	Melee attack	1 woman injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
27-12-12	New York City, New York	Murder	A Muslim Indian man pushed onto train track	Anti-Muslim hatred
29-04-13	Birmingham, England	Stabbing	Mohammed Saleem was stabbed to death while on his way home from Green Lane Masjid	Anti-Muslim hatred
19-11-13	Montreal, Quebec	Melee attack	1 woman injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
31-12-13	Vancouver, British Columbia	Bomb threat	Vancouver Mosque	Anti-Muslim hatred
16-03-14	Sacramento, California	Shooting	An Iraqi Muslim killed	Hatred for Middle Eastern Muslims
29-03-14	Colchester, Essex	Stabbing	A Saudi Arabian student in hijab killed	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
24-06-14	Bambari	Shooting	17 killed	Anti-Muslim hatred
02-07-14	Shuafat	Kidnapping, melee attack	1 murdered	Xenophobia
24-11-14	Lleida, Catalonia	Stabbing	5 Arab Muslims injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
26-11-14	Montreal, Quebec	Bomb threat	Montreal Mosque	Anti-Muslim hatred
04-12-14	Kansas City, Missouri	Vehicular attack	A Muslim Somali-American student killed	Anti-Muslim hatred
14-01-15	Le Beauquet	Stabbing	1 killed & 1 injured	Terrorism; Extremism
28-09-15	Dadri	Melee attack	1 killed & 1 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
03-11-15	Kos	Melee attack	Several injured	Xenophobia
14-11-15	Peterborough, Ontario	Arson	Peterborough Mosque set on fire	Anti-Muslim hatred
26-12-15	Fresno, California	Melee attack	Sikh man killed	Mistaken for Muslim

(Continued)



**Table1. (Continued)**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Modes of attacks</b>	<b>Victims</b>	<b>Causes</b>
27-02-16	Enschede, Overijssel	Arson	Mosque destroyed	Anti-Muslim hatred
23-03-16	Madrid	Arson	The Great Mosque of the M-30 of Madrid damaged	Anti-Muslim hatred
23-06-16	Bago	Arson	Mosque demolished	Anti-Muslim hatred
29-06-16	Minneapolis Minnesota	Shooting	5 Somali-Americans shot & 2 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
02-07-16	Hpakant	Arson	Mosque burned down	Anti-Muslim hatred
03-07-16	Sunderland, England	Melee attack	A Muslim woman assaulted & injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
07-08-16	Tirana	Melee attack	1 hijab woman injured	Stigmatisation
13-08-16	New York City, New York	Shooting	2 Muslim clerics killed	Anti-Muslim hatred
11-10-16	Garden City, Kansas	Attempted car bombing	Plan to detonate explosives in 4 trucks to bomb Muslim refugees apartment blocks	Anti-Muslim hatred
20-10-16	Fort Smith, Arkansas	Vandalism	2 Mosques damaged	Xenophobia; Anti-Muslim hatred
07-11-16	Barcelona, Catalonia	Melee attack	A pregnant Muslim woman with a Niqab injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
27-11-16	Sept-Îles, Quebec	Vandalism	Sept-Îles Mosque vandalized	Anti-Muslim hatred
27-11-16	Dresden, Saxony	Bombing	A Mosque & convention centre bombed	Xenophobia; Nationalism
06-12-16	Perth	Melee attack	1 Muslim woman injured	Refusal to reply Xmas greeting
10-12-16	Simi Valley, California	Stabbing	A Muslim was stabbed	Anti-Muslim hatred
16-12-16	London, England	Melee attack	A Muslim woman dragged along the pavement by her hijab & injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
19-12-16	Zürich	Shooting	2 killed & 3 injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
28-12-16	Culemborg, Utrecht	Arson	Islamic centre burned	Anti-Muslim hatred
29-01-17	Quebec City, Quebec	Mass shooting	6 killed & 19 injured	Terrorism/Hate crime
9-02-17	Melbourne	Verbal attack	Group of Muslims	Auctioned Cartoons
21-02-17	Gothenburg	Arson	An Islamic Centre set on fire	Anti-Muslim hatred
23-02-17	Olathe, Kansas	Shooting	1 killed & 2 injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
10-03-17	Salem, Oregon	Melee attack	Arab employee injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
19-03-17	Melbourne	Stabbing	A priest injured	Mistaken for Muslim
11-05-17	Sydney	Melee attack	4 Muslim women injured	Hate crime

(Continued)

Date	Location	Modes of attacks	Victims	Causes
26-05-17	Portland, Oregon	Melee attack, stabbing	2 killed & 1 injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
19-06-17	London, England	Vehicular attack	1 killed & 11 injured	Terrorism; Anti-Muslim hatred
24-06-17	Haryana	Melee attack	1 killed & 3 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
4-07-17	Sittwe	Mob attacks	1 killed & 6 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred
12-07-17	Farrukhabad	Melee attack, robbery	10 injured	Anti-Muslim hatred; Racism
03-08-17	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	Melee attack	A Muslim food-cart owner injured	Xenophobia; Hate crime
05-08-17	Bloomington, Minnesota	Bombing	Dar Al-Farooq Islamic Centre bombed	Anti-Muslim hatred
23-08-17	Madrid	Melee attack	A Muslim woman injured	Racism; Anti-Muslim hatred
13-09-17	New York City, New York	Melee attack	1 Jewish woman & her daughter beaten up	Mistaken for Muslims
11-10-17	Kembe	Shooting	25 killed	Anti-Muslim hatred
20-11-17	Leicester, England	Vehicular attack	A Muslim woman injured	Racism
15-03-19	Christchurch	Shooting	51 killed & 50+ injured	Extremism; Xenophobia; Anti-Muslim hatred
Mar '19	Colindale	Gun gesture	A Muslim mother & her daughter	Anti-Muslim hatred linked to NZ attacks
Mar '19	Oxford	Harassment	A Muslim woman with hijab	Anti-Muslim hatred
Mar '19	Scotland	Melee attack	Mosque attacked	Anti-Muslim hatred

Source: Dauda (2020)

Statistics Canada identified that in Canada hate crimes against Muslims raised 253%, which is from 2012 to 2015 (The Conversation, 6 February 2019). In Germany, there were 813 recorded attacks against Mosques and Muslims in 2018 (TRTWorld Magazine, 16 May 2019). In the UK, anti-Muslim violence in 2017 increased by 26% with 1,201 reported incidents (Dauda, 2020). In New Zealand, an attack on two of the Mosques in Christchurch on March 2019 injured over 50 and killed 51 Muslims (Graham McLay, 2019).

In Asian countries, Muslims have been targeted in several attacks linked to Islamophobia. For example, the Chinese government is suspected of detaining an estimated a million Uighur Muslims (ChinaFile Conversation, 2019). In India, approximately 10 Muslims have been murdered in public during the rise of Islamophobia since April 2017 (Amnesty International, 2017).

Table 1 by Dauda (2020) reveals the cases of Islamophobia around the world between 2001 and 2019. The table also demonstrates that no continent is safe from Islamophobic threats, even the one with democratic system. The European countries show the highest records of this problem, whereas the American and Asian countries are following. Anti-Muslim hatred stimulates the major cause of these incidents, followed by racism, xenophobia, extremism, and revenge. Recorded by Dauda (2020) and Sampathkumar (2017), the White supremacists and the Far—right, Right—wing, and Neo-Nazi extremists committed an extensive number of attacks toward Muslims. Dauda

(2020) explains that Muslim women who display an observable manifestation of their religious identity (such as women wearing hijab) have been the frequent target of the attacks, followed by Muslim men with beard or other religious outfits (e.g., Turban). The “visual manifestation” of Islam (e.g., traditions, symbols, buildings, properties) and Muslims who “look like Muslims” become targets for hostility (Nielsen & Allen, 2002).

### 5. Historical context of Islamophobia

Esposito (2017) proclaims that, similarly to xenophobia and anti-Semitism, Islamophobia is historically rooted. Islamophobia is not a brand-new phenomenon as it is rooted in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries during the European Crusades and in the late fifteenth century during the dismissal of Muslims (e.g., Arabs and Africans) from Andalusia (Abdulhadi, 2018). Islamophobia is also rooted in European colonialism, Orientalism, and East-West dichotomy (Abdulhadi, 2018). Bleich (2011) has outlined the use of “Islamophobia” as a new word in Said’s study in 1978 which titled “Orientalism in the late 1970s”. In this publication, it was widely recognized/agreed that the West society had been associating Islam with negative images, stereotypes, and sentiments. Orientalism explains how the western cultural, imperial, and academic works have constructed a dehumanising representation of the Arab world as “exotic and barbarous Orient” (Dauda, 2020, p. 264). By interpreting the West as “civilised” and the Arab world as “backwards”, Orientalism demonstrates the earliest stigmatization against Muslim identities and produces the negative stereotypes of Eastern cultures to justify colonial ambitions (Itaoui & Elsheikh, 2018, p. 7).

According to Benn and Jawad (2003), Islamophobia has escalated since Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa in 1989 (which provoked Muslims to execute Salman Rushdie, the writer of *The Satanic Verses*) and since the 9/11 attacks (Dauda, 2020; Nielsen & Allen, 2002). In line with this, the International Civil Liberties Alliance [ICLA] (2013) explains that Islamophobia has not been documented in English until around 1950s, and they record that Islamophobia became more extensive after the Iranian fatwa against Salman Rushdie (due to his book “*The Satanic Verses*”). Hasan (in ICLA, 2013) also describes that the terminology “Islamophobia” emerged for the first time in the UK in 1980s amid the Rushdie issue.

The study of Islamophobia started in 1995 in England where Islam was perceived as a threat, similar to Communism and the Nazi, and associated with infiltration, invasion, and domination (Istriyani & Yuliatun, 2016). Bleich (2011) then argues that Islamophobia initially developed in 1990s to counter harmful actions and rhetoric against Islam and Muslims in the West. Furthermore, Zúquete (2008) and Lee et al. (2009) explain that “Islamophobia” appeared in modern discussions after the report by the Runnymede Trust (1997), entitled “Islamophobia: a challenge for us all”. This report reveals that the term “Islamophobia” has been spread due to the resurgence after the Cold War and the 9/11 attack (Dauda, 2020; Vertovec, 2002).

Even though negative prejudices/sentiments have been targeted towards Islam for a long period of time and the hatred/discrimination towards Muslims is escalating in Europe, the number of Muslims is also increasing in the continent (Robby & Amrad, 2021). In France, for example, there are roughly five million French citizens adopting the Islamic faith. This number is the largest compared to the Muslim minority populations in the Western Europe (Robby & Amrad, 2021; Sayyid, 2014). In 2016, French Muslim population scopes 5,7 million citizens, or around 8,8% of the total amount of French population (Moordiningsih, 2004; Robby & Amrad, 2021). This increase of the French Muslim population drives racist movements which have a strong link to Islamophobia (MacMaster, 2003; Robby & Amrad, 2021). Islamophobia in France accordingly has risen since the 9/11 terrorist attack (e.g., attacks against Mosque, Muslim cemeteries, individual Muslims) (Robby & Amrad, 2021; Wijaya, 2010); whereas the relations between Muslim immigrants and the general French population were relatively good before the terrorist attack (Robby & Amrad, 2021). The European Monitoring Research Center in 2002 observes that the 9/11 attack has promoted the escalation of hatred against Muslims in many European countries, especially France (Iner & Nebhan, 2019; Najib & Teeple Hopkins, 2020; Nielsen & Allen, 2002; Robby & Amrad, 2021; Silverstein, 2008). The change of attitude or behavior

was due to the perception (of several French) that Islam and general Muslims have to be responsible for the terrorist attack (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Some of the native white French even wanted Muslim immigrants to leave France because of their fear of Islam and anything related to Islam (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Furthermore, the terrorist action against Charlie Hebdo's office made it worse that it has increased hatred toward Muslims in France. After this action, the right-wing political mobilization/movements against Muslims have become stronger than ever (Dauda, 2020; Nielsen & Allen, 2002; Rachman, 2018; Robby & Amrad, 2021). The presence of Muslims has made the right-wing politicians in France evaluate the political principles of "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite" that welcome refugees, as the rise of Islamophobia in France has destroyed the equality and brotherhood in the country and affected the stability and security in European countries (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Furthermore, Muslim communities become the main victims of the extremist right-wing groups' terror attacks in Europe (Bayrakli & Hafez, n.d.).

## 6. The causes of Islamophobia

The causes of Islamophobia are explained through several approaches: 1) *individual*, 2) *social-cognition*, 3) *intergroup interaction*, and 4) *sociocultural*. At *individual approach*, Islamophobia is caused by prejudice and hatred towards particular people due to the nurturing process (Moordiningsih, 2004). Nesdale (in Augoustinos & Dan Reynolds, 2001) describes the four factors which could develop prejudice in a child: *emotional maladjustment*, *social reflection/likeness*, *cognitive and social development*, and *social identity*. *Emotional maladjustment* is related to authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950/1982). In this case, children who are raised by authoritarian parents who apply frustrating disciplines would generate bitterness in children (e.g., anger, frustration, and hatred toward others as a displacement). *Social reflection* is related to social learning, such as gaining rewards for having negative thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors against others from parents and significant others (Bandura, 1977; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Moreover, *social identity* is related to the motivation/desires to define one's group (e.g., a race, a group of religious believers) as more advanced/better/higher than others' in order to increase self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further, *cognitive and social development* is related to cognitive experience of children between 5 and 7 years old where they begin to perceive differences among humans (Aboud, 1988). Prejudice in an individual occurs because his/her lack of knowledge creates assumptions during perception development and fears of the unknown (Moordiningsih, 2004). Tajfel (1972) also argues that perceptible physical differences could also generate prejudice; nevertheless, the stronger prejudice, such as among religious believers and people with different sexual orientation, could also happen amid the absence of observable physical differences. In terms of cognitive development, Runnymede Trust (1997) explains that the views on Islam could be the key to understanding Islamophobia. Phobia and fears subjected to Islam are the result of closed views on Islam, whereas respects/appreciation, logical disagreement, and critiques are from the open views on Islam (Abdel-Hady, 2004).

At *social-cognition* approach, Islamophobia is caused by stereotype made by individuals to reduce the overflowing amount of information that needs to be processed (Moordiningsih, 2004). Stereotype itself is transmissible beliefs about characteristics (e.g., personalities, behaviors, and values) of a group of people (Lippmann, 1922). This approach emphasizes on how information is collected, processed, and recognized in memory and how prejudice often occurs because of a falseness in information processing (Ashmore & Delbolca, 1981; Moordiningsih, 2004).

At *intergroup-interaction* approach, Islamophobia is caused by prejudice derived from "in-group and out-group thinking" in a group process. According to Social Identity Theory (in Moordiningsih, 2004), favoritism when making/joining a group (e.g., creating "we are better than them" way of thinking) is unavoidable. Moreover, Social Categorization Theory explains the correlation between individuals and groups, individuals' pathway in joining groups, circumstances which determine a person to act as an individual or a member of a group, and subjectivity/bias/social antagonism developed by being in a group (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Further, xenophobia (the hatred/fear of foreigners) is another origin of Islamophobia (Dauda, 2020). Alan (2011) even argues that

Islamophobia is similar to xenophobia or racism but covered in religious terms. Xenophobia is spread through the settlers/indigenes' dynamic public narratives which aggressively labels/stigmatizes immigrants as a threat or scapegoats for socio-economic troubles in the country (Crush, 2015).

At *socio-cultural* approach, Islamophobia is caused by cultural conformity, objectives, and interests (Ashmore & Delbolca, 1981). In this situation, prejudice is developed by the internalization of socio-cultural norms and values. Lost in translation leading to prejudice/blaming/accusation is an example of this approach. Furthermore, visual identifiers (e.g., *hijab, burka, niqab*) stimulate the shifts of attitude and the rise of violence against Muslim, other ethnicity, or minority communities (Nielsen & Allen, 2002).

As mentioned earlier, this study aimed to understand the Indonesian Muslims' reaction or even prejudice toward one another. Using quantitative method of analysis, an instrument for measuring Islamophobia in this study is developed based on the above reviews on literature. Indicators of Islamophobia, based on the reviews, are clustered into three groups: *cognition, emotion, and actions*, aiming at several visual identifiers such as behaviors of Muslims, Islamic symbols, and Muslims with distinguished appearance (those different from the mainstream of society). Hence, the instrument includes these indicators.

## 7. Methods

### 7.1. Design

This study applied quantitative research design. The study's null hypothesis is that there is no significant amount of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant amount of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia as the Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Developing the "Islamophobia Scale" called as IMOS, the study was performed in three stages: 1) formulating indicators of Islamophobia, 2) identifying psychometric properties of IMOS, and 3) investigating Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia. Islamophobia as a construct is defined as a constant distress toward particular objects and/or practices recognized in Islam.

**Aspects of Islamophobia.** Aspects of Islamophobia were derived from literatures which are grouped into three main aspects: 1) *cognition* (e.g., prejudice, accusation, stigmatization), 2) *affection/emotion* (e.g., fear, hatred), and 3) *psychomotor/action* (e.g., rejection, discrimination). These aspects target several visual identifiers/observable practices in Islam, such as tangible behaviors of Muslims (i.e., traditions), Islamic symbols (i.e., mosques, centers, cemeteries), and Muslims with distinguished appearance who are different from the majority (Table 2).

Table 2. Aspects of Islamophobia		
No.	Aspects	Targets
1	<i>Cognition</i> : prejudice, accusation, and stigmatization	Muslims with distinguished appearance Islamic traditions Symbols in Islam
2	<i>Emotion</i> : fear, hatred, and other negative emotions	Muslims with distinguished appearance Islamic traditions Symbols in Islam
3	<i>Actions</i> : rejection, discrimination, elimination, alienation, and other violence	Muslims with distinguished appearance Islamic traditions Symbols in Islam

**Table 3. IMOS items before and after elimination**

No.	Aspects	Targets	Before elimination		After elimination	
			Item numbers	Total	Item numbers	Total
1	Cognition	Muslims with distinguished appearance (AC)	1-10	37	1-5	16
		Islamic traditions (TC)	25-37		11-16	
		Symbols in Islam (SC)	11-24		6-10	
2	Emotion	Muslims with distinguished appearance (AE)	38-46	32	17-20	14
		Islamic traditions (TE)	66-69		25-30	
		Symbols in Islam (SE)	47-65		21-24	
3	Actions	Muslims with distinguished appearance (AA)	70-84	36	31-34	14
		Islamic traditions (TA)	96-105		39-44	
		Symbols in Islam (SA)	85-95		35-38	
Total Item			105		<b>44</b>	

**The Development of Islamophobia Scale (IMOS).** IMOS was formulated by applying 1) *content validity* (validity based on test content) where all items of the scale were reviewed by seven experts (an Islamic anthropologist, a Muslim scholar, two forensic psychologists, a clinical psychologist, a psychometrician, and an academic in the International Relation) and 2) *internal-consistency validity* (validity based on internal structure) by examining the correlation of scale items to 312 respondents with Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).

Table 3 shows scale items of IMOS in each aspect before and after elimination. In terms of the correlation of each item, Table 4 demonstrates the factor loadings for 44 items of IMOS, whereas Table 5 shows the CFA Second Order. All factor loadings are from 0.68 to 0.90 ( $\geq 0.5$ ). In terms of reliability, IMOS' reliability coefficient (*Omega McDonald*) is 0.98. Furthermore, the norm of IMOS is presented in Table 6.

**8. Participants**

This study involved 509 participants (294 females, 215 males) in several cities in Indonesia (e.g., Batam, Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor, Depok, Jakarta, Lamongan, Malang, Padang, Riau, Surabaya, Tangerang). All of these participants were Muslims (149 non-practicing/*abangan*, 39 traditional-practicing influenced by family/*priyayi*, and 321 practicing and continuously studying Islam/*santri*). Participants' ages were 17-20/adolescence (188), 21-39/early adult (252), 40-59/mid adult (67), and >60 (2).

**Table 4. Factor loadings of each item of IMOS**

Factor	Indicator	Estimate	SE	Z	P	Stand. estimate
AC	p1	0.84	0.05	17.13	<.001	0.81
	p2	0.73	0.04	16.72	<.001	0.79
	p3	0.79	0.04	17.71	<.001	0.83
	p4	0.80	0.04	17.81	<.001	0.83
	p5	0.80	0.05	17.21	<.001	0.81
SC	p6	0.70	0.05	14.91	<.001	0.74
	p7	0.71	0.04	17.34	<.001	0.82
	p8	0.62	0.04	14.38	<.001	0.72
	p9	0.60	0.04	15.45	<.001	0.76
	p10	0.52	0.04	13.37	<.001	0.68
TC	p11	0.82	0.05	14.97	<.001	0.74
	p12	0.77	0.04	17.53	<.001	0.83
	p13	0.79	0.05	15.35	<.001	0.75
	p14	0.78	0.04	17.44	<.001	0.82
	p15	0.77	0.05	16.86	<.001	0.80
	p16	0.87	0.05	16.62	<.001	0.80
AE	p17	0.79	0.05	16.79	<.001	0.79
	p18	0.79	0.04	18.25	<.001	0.84
	p19	0.83	0.05	16.45	<.001	0.78
	p20	0.72	0.04	18.25	<.001	0.83
SE	p21	0.79	0.05	15.20	<.001	0.74
	p22	0.64	0.04	17.72	<.001	0.83
	p23	0.65	0.04	15.00	<.001	0.75
	p24	0.60	0.05	13.25	<.001	0.68
TE	p25	0.78	0.05	17.37	<.001	0.82
	p26	0.71	0.05	15.44	<.001	0.76
	p27	0.79	0.04	18.62	<.001	0.85
	p28	0.78	0.04	18.24	<.001	0.84
	p29	0.63	0.05	13.72	<.001	0.69
	p30	0.79	0.04	18.39	<.001	0.85
AA	p31	0.82	0.04	18.99	<.001	0.86
	p32	0.75	0.04	19.21	<.001	0.86
	p33	0.72	0.04	17.75	<.001	0.82
	p34	0.72	0.04	17.43	<.001	0.81
SA	p35	0.79	0.04	19.35	<.001	0.87
	p36	0.77	0.04	18.34	<.001	0.84
	p37	0.81	0.04	20.33	<.001	0.90
	p38	0.70	0.05	15.10	<.001	0.74
TA	p39	0.73	0.04	18.28	<.001	0.84
	p40	0.67	0.04	15.01	<.001	0.74
	p41	0.78	0.05	16.47	<.001	0.79
	p42	0.68	0.05	14.83	<.001	0.73
	p43	0.59	0.04	14.79	<.001	0.73
	p44	0.54	0.04	13.38	<.001	0.68

**Table 5. CFA second order for items in three aspects of IMOS**

Factor	Indicator	Estimate	SE	Z	p	Stand. estimate
Cognitive	AC	3.90	0.18	21.99	<.001	0.94
	SC	3.23	0.14	23.54	<.001	0.97
	TC	3.01	0.13	22.49	<.001	0.95
Emotion	AE	3.87	0.18	21.46	<.001	0.93
	SE	4.03	0.19	20.84	<.001	0.91
	TE	4.34	0.20	21.27	<.001	0.92
Action	AA	3.62	0.19	18.76	<.001	0.86
	SA	2.91	0.14	20.80	<.001	0.91
	TA	2.60	0.14	19.15	<.001	0.87

**Table 6. Norm of IMOS**

Score	Norm	Categories of Islamophobia
46–83	Negative Level of Islamophobia	Null
84–120	Zero Level of Islamophobia	
121–156	Low Level of Islamophobia	Low
157–193	Medium Level of Islamophobia	Medium
194–230	High Level of Islamophobia	High

In terms of educations, participants' education levels were primary school (1), junior high school (2), senior high school (100), diploma (6), bachelor (314), master (70), and doctoral degree (16). Moreover, 355 participants had joined formal Islamic school, whereas 154 had not. Furthermore, 238 participants searched for and received informal Islamic education (e.g., *taklim*, *liqoah*), while 181 did not. In terms of socio-political orientation, 125 participants stated that they joined Muslim organizations, while 384 did not. Further, 254 were interested in voting for religious-nationalist political parties, whereas 162 in pure nationalist and 93 in pure Islamic political parties.

### 9. Sampling

This study used accidental sampling. Accidental sampling (also called convenient or opportunity sampling), according to Alvi (2016), is a technique of sampling where the researchers include the participants who are convenient/easy to approach. This technique is suitable where population target is very broad (i.e., men and women, girls and boys, rich and poor). The method of this technique is by approaching any available individual of the target population (he/she is requested to participate in the research, then the research is conducted after they indicate consent). The technique has several advantages such as consuming fewer efforts, inexpensive, and being less time consuming. However, it has a disadvantage which is related to the broad/infinite target population (Alvi, 2016).

### 10. Procedures and material

This study initially developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) to measure Islamophobia by listing aspects for the construct (based on literature review), making items, testing items, and defining psychometric properties of the scale (Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, 2014). Items were checked and modified during content analysis to avoid social desirability. Social desirability is the participants' tendency to provide certain answers which they think are more socially acceptable than the "true" answer (Lavrakas, 2008). The participants do this to present themselves to be "likeable" by the society and avoid negative image/evaluations. The products of



social desirability are the overstating of socially desirable behaviors/attitudes and the understating of socially undesirable behaviors/attitudes. Social desirability is categorized into bias or one of the respondent-related sources of error, according to Lavrakas (2008); hence, it is avoided in this study.

For quantitative examination of IMOS, the researchers conducted a pilot study to identify psychometric properties of the scale prior to data collection for the study. Data collection was conducted on October 2021 for 2 weeks (from 11 to 24 October 2021). Due to COVID-19 pandemic, the scale was spread online to participants in eight universities from different cities, six Whatsapp groups (which have members above 17 years old), and counterterrorism forums. Inform consent and explanation of the research were given in the introduction section of the scale.

During the data collection, two of the researchers received complaints from people who considered the items of the scale as containing prejudice towards Islam and Muslims. The researchers, accordingly, explained the purpose of this study, which was to uncover any prejudice, fear, and rejection towards Islam and other Muslims in the Muslim-majority society like Indonesia. Moreover, at least two candidates of participants withdrew from the research while filling the scale: one of them could not manage to have a sufficient internet connection, while the other disagreed on an item about the quality of religious practice. The latter disagreed with the term *priyayi*, *abangan*, and *santri* by Geertz (1960) mentioned in the item.

### 11. Analysis

Prior to investigating Islamophobia, the study analyzed the efficacy of IMOS in measuring Islamophobia. The analysis of IMOS was to identify the psychometric properties of the instrument. In this, researchers identified the validity and reliability coefficient of IMOS by referring to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (2014). As mentioned in an earlier section, the formulation of IMOS applied *content validity* (validity based on test content) with expert review and *internal-consistency validity* (validity based on internal structure) by correlating all items of scale with *Confirmatory Factor Analysis* (CFA). Reliability was analyzed with *Omega McDonald* coefficient. For analyzing research results, the researchers of this study used descriptive statistics by reviewing frequencies and matrix of variables (with *Chi-squares*). Moreover, *Analysis of Variance* (ANOVA) was implemented to examine differences between variables.

### 12. Results

The findings of this study demonstrate that 92% of Muslims in Indonesia do not show any sign of Islamophobia. This demonstrates that the study's null hypothesis is proven. The Muslims do not demonstrate any prejudice or stigmatization (*cognition*), fear/hatred (*affection*), and rejection or discrimination (*action*) towards several observable practices in Islam, which include symbols (i.e., mosques, centers, cemeteries), traditions, and other Muslims with different appearance from the majority. Nevertheless, 7.67% participants are showing Islamophobia: 5% (27) of participants are categorized into the group with low level of Islamophobia, 1% (9) participants are into the medium, and 0.59% (3) are into the high, as seen in Table 7.

**Table 7. Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia**

Categories of Islamophobia	Participants
Null	470
Low	27
Medium	9
High	3
Total	509

**Table 8. Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia in three aspects of behavior**

<b>Cognition</b>	<b>Action</b>			<b>Emotion</b>		
	<b>Appearances</b>	<b>Symbols</b>	<b>Tradition</b>	<b>Appearances</b>	<b>Symbols</b>	<b>Tradition</b>
8.11	8.95	8.03	7.43	10.50	5.58	6.47
8.36				7.84		9.19
						7.19

**Notes:** A higher score indicates increased Islamophobia.

**Table 9. Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia towards different targets**

<b>Symbols</b>	<b>Appearances</b>			<b>Tradition</b>		
	<b>Action</b>	<b>Emotion</b>	<b>Cognition</b>	<b>Action</b>	<b>Cognition</b>	<b>Emotion</b>
8.95	10.50	9.19	8.11	7.43	8.03	5.92
9.55				7.34		6.51

**Notes:** A higher score indicates increased Islamophobia.

Overall, 7.67% of participants show stigmatization and accusation towards other Muslims with distinguished appearance (e.g., Muslims whose appearance is associated with conflict areas, Middle Eastern, unknown cultures), for example, by labeling them “terrorists”, “radicals”, “woma-nizers”, or “violent”. They express feelings of discomfort, fear, or hatred, and show rejection and discrimination against other Muslims with particular shapes of beard or outfits associated with conflict areas (i.e., Afghanistan, Iraq, Yaman). These participants also find certain Islamic traditions (i.e., *fiqh*, sharia law, segregation between men and women, prayer calling, holding *tasbih*/prayer beads, the use of *niqab* for women) and symbols (i.e., Muslim names, Islamic schools, *imams*/clerics) outdated or even intimidating and threatening.

Among the three aspects, participants showed the highest score in *cognition* (i.e., prejudice/accusation) followed by *action* (i.e., rejection, discrimination) and *emotion* (i.e., hatred, fear), even though the scores are not significant in portraying Islamophobia (Table 8). Furthermore, the

**Table 10 Analysis on levels of islamophobia**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				
<b>Sex</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	<b>Total</b>
Male	10	6	3	196	215
Female	17	3	0	274	294
Total	27	9	3	470	509
<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>					
	<b>Value</b>		<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>	
X <sup>2</sup>	8.997		4	0.061	
N	509				
<b>Nominal</b>					
					<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient					0.132

**Table 11. Analysis on correlation between the variables of age and level of Islamophobia**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				
<b>Age</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	<b>Total</b>
17-20	12	2	1	173	188
20-40	13	5	2	232	252
40-60	2	2	0	63	67
> 60	0	0	0	2	2
Total	27	9	3	470	509
<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>					
	<b>Value</b>		<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>	
X <sup>2</sup>	3.684		12	0.988	
N	509				
<b>Nominal</b>					
					<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient					0.085

**Table 12. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with different levels of religiosity**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
<b>Religiosity</b>	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	
Low	0	1	0	1	2
Medium	7	1	0	10	18
High	1	0	0	4	5
Very high	19	7	3	455	484
Total	27	9	3	470	509

  

<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>			
	<b>Value</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>P</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	85.094	12	<.001
N	509		

  

<b>Nominal</b>	
	<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient	0.378

findings indicate that particular Islamic symbols (in this case, Islamic schools/centers, *imams*, and Arabic language) gain more attention than other observable identifiers, such as Muslims with distinguished appearance and certain Muslim traditions practiced in Indonesia such as *hijab* wearing, holding *tasbeih*/praying beads when walking, and five-time-a-day prayer calling at mosques (Table 9).

In terms of sex and age, the findings show there is no correlation between sex and level of Islamophobia. Scores of female and male participants indicate no significant difference. Chi-square shows that female and male participants express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 10). Likewise, a significant correlation does not appear between the variables of age and level of Islamophobia (Table 11). Correlation degree between the two is 0.085 with  $p = 0.998$ .

In terms of religiosity, 484 participants were believing in the six pillars of Islam (e.g., believe in God, the Messenger of God, sacred texts, and the presence of afterlife, angels, and destiny), whereas the rest were still learning. Based on quantitative examination on the link between the levels of religiosity and Islamophobia, the findings indicate 0.378 level of correlation ( $p < 0.001$ ); which means there is a significantly negative correlation between the level of religiosity and Islamophobia. Participants with higher religiosity show lower levels of Islamophobia, and vice versa, participants with lower religiosity indicate higher levels of Islamophobia (Table 12).

In terms of religious practices (categorized into three separate types: *Abangan*, *Priyayi*, and *Santri*), quantitative examination showed 0.101 level of correlation (with  $p = 0.728$ ). This means there is no significant correlation between participants' religious practices and level of Islamophobia. ANOVA shows that all types of Indonesian Muslims, regardless of their quality of religious practices, express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 13).

In terms of level of education, the statistical examination shows 0.168 degree of correlation between the levels of formal education and Islamophobia ( $p = 0.926$ ). This means that there is no significant correlation between the two variables (Table 14). Furthermore, the quantitative examination demonstrates 0.09 degree of correlation between participants' attendance to formal Islamic education (i.e., private Islamic schools) and their level of Islamophobia ( $p = 0.365$ ), which means that there is no significant correlation between the two variables either (Table 15). Nevertheless, the statistical analysis demonstrates that there is a significantly negative correlation

**Table 13. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with different qualities of religious practice**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
<b>Muslim Types*</b>	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	
<i>Abangan</i>	9	3	1	136	149
<i>Priyayi</i>	2	2	0	35	39
<i>Santri</i>	16	4	2	299	321
Total	27	9	3	470	509

  

<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>			
	<b>Value</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	5.369	8	0.728
N	509		

  

<b>Nominal</b>		<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient		0.101

  

<b>ANOVA</b>					
<b>Cases</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>p</b>
Muslim Types	4084.4	2	2092.474	2.206	0.111
Residuals	480028.280	506	948.674		

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

  

<b>Descriptives</b>			
<b>Muslim Types</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>N</b>
<i>Abangan</i>	74.450	32.318	149
<i>Priyayi</i>	79.872	36.898	39
<i>Santri</i>	70.318	293246	321

\*Notes: *Abangan*: Non-practicing  
*Priyayi*: Traditional-practicing influenced by family  
*Santri*: Practicing and continuously studying Islam

between participants' attendance to informal Islamic education and Islamophobia. The level of correlation between the two variables is 0.092 with  $p = 0.359$ . ANOVA table reveals the difference between participants who have attended informal Islamic education (such as courses, *taklim*, *madrasah*, *pesantren*, *liqoah*, *tarbiyah*) and the ones who have not. Those who have received additional Islamic education (other than formal curriculum received at schools) do not indicate any sign of Islamophobia, and vice versa, the ones who have not attended any informal Islamic education express their fear, prejudice, and even rejection towards certain Islamic symbols (i.e., Islamic schools/centers, *imams*), religious traditions, and Muslims with distinguished appearance (Table 16).

Related to socio-political orientation, the numerical investigation proves 0.120 degree of correlation between participants' involvement in Islamic organization and their level of Islamophobia ( $p = 0.114$ ). The findings show that there is no significant correlation between the two variables. ANOVA indicates that both groups (Muslims who join and do not join any Islamic organizations) express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 17). On the contrary, ANOVA demonstrates that there is a significant correlation between political preferences and level of Islamophobia. Islamophobia is significantly seen in participants who vote for pure nationalist political parties

**Table 14. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with different levels of formal education**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
<b>Formal Education</b>	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	<b>Total</b>
Doctoral	0	1	0	15	16
Master	4	3	1	62	70
Bachelor	19	3	1	291	314
Diploma	1	0	0	4	6
Senior High	3	2	1	94	100
Junior High	0	0	0	2	2
Primary	0	0	0	1	1
Total	27	9	3	470	509

  

<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>			
	<b>Value</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	14.807	24	0.926
N	509		

  

<b>Nominal</b>	
	<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient	0.168

(Table 18). Correlation degree between the two variables (political preference and Islamophobia) is 0,178 ( $p = 0.034$ ) (Table 18).

### 13. Discussions

Islamophobia has a long history (Esposito, 2017). However, the 9/11 tragedy in 2001 has worsened the situation (Dauda, 2020). The 9/11 tragedy has brought agony to all global citizens, including the Western society and Muslims around the world. Islam has been strongly associated with terrorism because several terrorist organizations use the name “Islam” in their actions, so that violence against general Muslims is viewed as justified by “some people” in order to get revenge. Islamophobia has been growing strongly in many countries since the 9/11 attack. This study aimed to investigate if Islamophobia could happen among Muslims themselves in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia, and to understand the Indonesian Muslims’ reaction or even prejudice toward one another to avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists.

The study applied quantitative analysis to 509 Muslim participants from several cities in Indonesia and formulated the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS). The scale measures three aspects of Islamophobia: *cognition*, *affection*, and *action*. As argued by Sayyid (2014), the presentation of Islamophobia is complex and multifaceted in which it reflects social or psychological profiles of the individuals. This study supports Sayyid’s (2014) explanation that Islamophobia consists of specific assemblages/elements and one can measure Islamophobia and counter it by identifying these elements.

The findings of this study show that 92% of Muslim participants do not demonstrate any sign of Islamophobia. This shows that the study’s null hypothesis is proven (that there is no significant number of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia). Nonetheless, the 7.67% expresses certain levels of prejudice, feelings of fear, and rejection against other Muslims with distinguished appearance (i.e. labeling those whose appearance is associated with Middle Eastern and conflict areas as “terrorists” or “radicals”), Islamic traditions (i.e., sharia law, *niqab*) and

**Table 15. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with formal Islamic education**

**Contingency Tables**

Formal Islamic Education	Categories of Islamophobia				Total
	Low	Medium	High	Null	
No	12	4	1	137	154
Yes	15	5	2	333	355
Total	27	9	3	470	509

**Chi-Squared Tests**

	Value	df	p
X <sup>2</sup>	4.318	4	0.365
N	509		

**Nominal**

	Value
Contingency coefficient	0.092

**ANOVA**

Cases	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p
Formal Islamic Education	1193.678	1	1193.678	1.253	0.264
Residuals	483020.090	507	952.702		

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

**Descriptives**

Formal Islamic Education	Mean	SD	N
No	74.584	33.40	154
Yes	71.251	29.70	355

symbols (i.e., Muslim names, Islamic schools, *imams*/clerics). Among the 7.67%, 5% is categorized into a group with low level of Islamophobia, 1% is into the medium, and 0.59% is into the high.

The findings reveal that among the three aspects of Islamophobia, participants show highest score in *cognition* (prejudice) followed by *action* (rejection) and *emotion* (fear). This finding indicates that cognitive process (such as prejudice and assumption) could be the “entry gate” for Islamophobia. As Sayyid (2014) explains, the end of Islamophobia can be achieved when the pathway or hierarchy of it dissolves and the specific elements that make it possible separate.

The findings show symbols, such as Islamic schools and *imams*, and other visual identifiers (for example, Muslims with distinguished appearance and observable traditions practiced in Indonesia) stimulate Islamophobia. The findings are in line with Najib and Teeple Hopkins’s (2020) argument that the foundational element of Islamophobic thinking is the denial of plurality and humanity of Muslim populations. As they describe, Islamophobia is a process of essentializing and homogenizing Muslims into physical and/or racial distinctions and positioning as the Other. Arguably, this Othering of racialized and essentialized Muslims may be undertaken by both non-Muslims and fellow Muslims. While non-Muslims associate Muslims with visible signs of Islamic belonging (beard, veils, but also geographical locations where Muslim communities are concentrated and mosques are built), Muslims may associate these and other features with Muslims who hold extremist interpretation of Islam, hence different from the rest of more moderate Muslims (Najib & Teeple Hopkins, 2020, Najib, 2021). Moreover, the Othering of Muslims by non-Muslims and



**Table 16. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with informal Islamic education**

<b>Contingency Tables</b>					
<b>Informal Islamic Education</b>	<b>Categories of Islamophobia</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Null</b>	
No	12	5	2	162	181
Yes	15	4	1	308	238
Total	27	9	3	470	509
<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>					
	<b>Value</b>		<b>df</b>	<b>p</b>	
X <sup>2</sup>	4.367		4	0.359	
N	509				
<b>Nominal</b>					
					<b>Value</b>
Contingency coefficient					0.092
<b>ANOVA</b>					
<b>Cases</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>p</b>
Informal Islamic Education	5978.630	1	5978.630	6.338	0.012
Residuals	478235.138	507	943.265		
Note. Type III Sum of Squares					
<b>Descriptives</b>					
<b>Informal Islamic Education</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>		<b>N</b>	
No	76.873	34.37		181	
Yes	69.713	28.49		328	

fellow Muslims is facilitated by visibility of physical features, but also due to government’s policy, notably counterterrorism and counter-violent extremism that create the notion of suspect communities, according to Breen-Smyth (2014). Defined as a “community created by the securitized imagination and enacted through a security practices of counterterrorism” (Breen-Smyth, 2014, p. 223), “suspect community” has a flexible and permeable boundary which allows its designator to change which communities and individuals are included in or excluded out and how the wider constituencies perceive the community. Islamophobia is therefore a form of subordination against the Other in the society, operating as an instrument that showcases the effectiveness of power in designating “us” and “them” (Breen-Smyth, 2014; CIGA, 2021; van Meeteren & van Oostendorp, 2019).

Because of the critical role of the ruling power in creating frames of inclusion within the suspect community which implicates on the building of Islamophobia, national leadership has a critical role in de-escalating Islamophobia. As Jeffrey Kaplan wrote, the US president together with decisive law-enforcement put a stop to a surging hate crime directed at Muslims in America following the 9/11 tragedy (Kaplan, 2006). Nevertheless, government’s counterterrorism—particularly that conducted by the US and client states whose counterterrorism policies the US government helped establish—had created legal and intelligence surveillance apparatuses that combine terrorists, criminals, ethnonationalist extremists, as well as civil society activities within the same pool of suspect community where Islam as an identity is also embedded

**Table 17. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims joining Islamic organizations**

		Categories of Islamophobia					Total
		Low	Medium	High	Null		
Joining Islamic Organizations	No	24	4	2	354	384	
	Yes	3	5	1	116	125	
	Total	27	9	3	470	509	
<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>							
	<b>Value</b>	<b>df</b>		<b>p</b>			
X <sup>2</sup>	7.438	4		0.114			
N	509						
<b>Nominal</b>							
Contingency coefficient							
<b>ANOVA</b>							
<b>Cases</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>P</b>		
Joining Islamic Organizations	49.879	1	34.879	0.052	0.819		
Residuals	484.163.889	507	954.958				
Note. Type III Sum of Squares							
<b>Descriptives</b>							
<b>Joining Islamic Organizations</b>	<b>SD</b>					<b>N</b>	
No	72.081	29.97	384				
Yes	72.808	33.61	125				

**Table 18. Islamophobia amongst Indonesian Muslims with different political preferences**

Contingency Tables		Categories of Islamophobia					
		Low	Medium	High	Null	Total	
<b>Political preferences</b>							
Mixed	11	1	1	241	254		
Pure Nationalist Parties	14	5	1	142	162		
Pure Islamic Parties	2	3	1	87	93		
Total	27	9	3	470	509		
<b>Chi-Squared Tests</b>							
		<b>Value</b>		<b>df</b>		<b>P</b>	
$\chi^2$		16.665		8		0.034	
N		509					
<b>Nominal</b>							
		<b>Value</b>		<b>Value</b>			
Contingency coefficient						0.178	
<b>ANOVA</b>							
<b>Cases</b>	<b>Sum of Squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Mean Square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>P</b>		
Political preferences	10246.725	2	5123.362	5.470	0.004		
Residuals	473967.043	506	936.694				

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

(Marusek, 2018). Accordingly, the current study could suggest counterterrorism practitioners to manage a softer approach in counter-narrative programs and prevent prejudice/stigma that would jeopardize peaceful coexistence.

The results of this study demonstrate that variables of age, sex, formal education, quality of religious practice (in Indonesia is categorized as *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi*), and involvement in Islamic organizations have no significant contributions to the emergence of Islamophobia. However, other variables such as religiosity, informal Islamic education, and political preference have significantly negative correlations with Islamophobia. The findings imply that religiosity, additional/informal Islamic education, and political preference could reduce or even prevent the occurrence of Islamophobia. Other than that, this study could contribute to the literature on Islamophobia for its academic implication.

This study developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) with its satisfying psychometric properties. Despite its originality and accomplishment in creating a scale to measure Islamophobia, the study has limitations. The limitation is related to its generalizability. The study may not be applied to societies in countries/cultures beyond Indonesia. Further studies suggested are related to the investigation of Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia by using different techniques of sampling, such as proportional sampling in every city in Indonesia. Other than that, it is also important to investigate Islamophobia among minorities in Indonesia and the design of softer approach/programs in Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) that will avoid prejudice and stigmatizations.

#### Author details

Zora Arfina Sukabdi<sup>1</sup>  
E-mail: [zora.arfina@ui.ac.id](mailto:zora.arfina@ui.ac.id)  
ORCID ID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4175-7339>  
Muhammad Adlin Sila<sup>2</sup>  
Chandra Yudistira Purnama<sup>3</sup>  
Fathul Lubabin Nuqul<sup>4</sup>  
ORCID ID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3789-9940>  
Seta Ariawuri Wicaksana<sup>5</sup>  
Ali Abdullah Wibisono<sup>1</sup>  
Yanwar Arief<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

<sup>2</sup> Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta.

<sup>3</sup> Jenderal Achmad Yani University.

<sup>4</sup> State Islamic University of Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang.

<sup>5</sup> Pancasila University.

<sup>6</sup> Islamic University of Riau.

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